Do People Bundle Sequences of Choices?
An Experimental Investigation by Ainslie, George et al.
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
ExCEN Working Papers Experimental Economics Center 
7-1-2018 
Do People Bundle Sequences of Choices? An Experimental 
Investigation 
George Ainslie 
University of Cape Town 
Glenn Harrison 




Georgia State University 
Alexander Schuhr 
Georgia State University 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Ainslie, George; Harrison, Glenn; Lau, Morten; Ross, Don; Schuhr, Alexander; and Swarthout, Todd, "Do 
People Bundle Sequences of Choices? An Experimental Investigation" (2018). ExCEN Working Papers. 11. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Experimental Economics Center at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ExCEN Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
Authors 
George Ainslie, Glenn Harrison, Morten Lau, Don Ross, Alexander Schuhr, and Todd Swarthout 
This article is available at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/
excen_workingpapers/11 
 
Do People Bundle Sequences of Choices? 
 
An Experimental Investigation 
 
 
George Ainslie, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, Don Ross,  
 





Abstract. Economists and psychologists have sought to model and explain both impulsive behavior and 
the costly but often successful mechanisms by which people control it. Ainslie [1975][1992][2001] 
suggests that self-control is often achieved on account of a phenomenon he calls “choice bundling.” This 
refers to re-framing of series of discrete choices as single choices over whole series. Whereas other core 
elements of Ainslie’s account of self-regulation, such as hyperbolic discounting and intrapersonal 
bargaining among temporally distinguished selves have been subject to extensive modeling by 
economists, choice bundling has been absent from the economic literature because it has never been 
empirically isolated in a controlled setting that meets the methodological requirements of the discipline. 
We report a laboratory experiment that fills this gap. Subjects made choices between smaller, sooner and 
larger, later real monetary rewards under experimental treatments that allowed us to discriminate between 
choice bundling, reliance on pre-commitment, and possible magnitude effects on intertemporal 
discounting. Risk preference measures were used to obtain accurate discounting estimates, based on 
estimation of mixture models that incorporate exponential, hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
functions. We use structural econometric procedures which are well established in the literature on binary 
choice and find strong support for the hypothesis that subjects bundled choices when conditions allowed 
them to do so, and consequently exhibited different discounting behavior in these conditions.  
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 1. The Idea of Choice Bundling 
According to familiar folk wisdom, at some present time t1 people often claim to prefer that 
at future times t2, …, tn they will not drink alcohol to excess, make reckless impulse purchases, 
underinvest in their pensions, or procrastinate. Then, when temptations of these kinds arrive, they 
choose in ways that seem to conflict with these earlier reported preferences. No doubt many 
instances of such inconsistency can be explained away as cheap talk, but a large, partially connected, 
literature in economics and psychology rests on the assumption that many cannot: efforts to forestall 
procrastination, addiction, impulsive consumption, and simple thoughtless bad habits lead to real 
behavior with real opportunity costs. Furthermore, unsuccessful efforts of this kind, to mitigate this 
behavior, lead to apparent intertemporal preference inconsistencies that are challenging to 
rationalize in theoretical models. For example, as observed by Schelling [1980], smokers attempting 
to quit often destroy their cigarettes, only to go to the shop for more when their resolve collapses. 
The addiction literature is rife with similar examples of costly, unsuccessful attempts at commitment 
to future abstinence (Elster [1979][1997]). On the other hand, many people avoid habitual 
consumption of addictive substances, wait for investments to mature before harvesting them, save 
for rainy days and golden years, and meet their work deadlines. 
A general theory of intertemporal choice, whether framed in terms of actions or in terms of  
revealed preferences, needs to accommodate these familiar facts. Consequently, temporally 
inconsistent preference dynamics, in which choices over immediate consumption imply preference 
structures in tension with preferences over the same choices arising further into the future, have 
been modeled by a number of economists. Examples include Becker and Murphy [1988], Akerlof 
[1991], O’Donoghue and Rabin [1999][2000][2001], Gul and Pesendorfer [2001], Bénabou and 
Tirole [2004], Benhabib and Bisin [2004], Bernheim and Rangel [2004], Fudenberg and Levine 
[2006][2012] and Heidhues and Koszegi [2009]. The feature common to all of these models, except 
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the first,1 is that they relax the standard assumption of exponential discounting. They differ from 
one another in the specific structural departures they propose, and in the psychological “stories” 
they suggest to render their models intuitively applicable to human behavior as it is encountered in 
daily life and observed in the behavioral laboratory. All of the models feature parameters that, on 
specific settings, yield standard exponential discounting with implied intertemporal preference 
consistency as a special case. In general the models do not seek to explain why some people reveal 
intertemporally consistent choices and others do not. Rather, they provide specifications that 
characterize this heterogeneity, and structures that can potentially be used to identify it in choice data. 
Schelling [1978][1980][1984] is unusual among economists in offering reflections on the 
phenomenological2 differences between succumbing to past resolutions, and resisting temptations to 
choose in contradiction to those past resolutions. Informally contemplating his experience as a 
reformed smoker who kicked the habit only following a struggle and a course of false starts, he 
described strategic subtleties involved in the self-management of motivations, decisions to adopt 
new personal policies, and responses to opportunities for exploiting loopholes in such policies. For 
example, a smoker might promise to pay fines levied by her friends and family if they catch her 
smoking, then arrange to make solitary trips out of town for no compelling purpose except to be 
able to smoke without fear of detection. Schelling [1978][1980][1984] suggests that such 
complications explain why most addicts achieve stable abstinence or controlled consumption only 
                                                 
1 Becker and Murphy [1988] retain exponential discounting in their model of addiction, along with the 
assumption of utility maximization at each point of choice. The cost, as pointed out by various critics such 
as Ross, Sharp, Vuchinich and Spurrett [2008; §3.1], is that they inadvertently change the subject: their 
model explains habitual consumption rather than addiction. In habituation, past choice of an alternative 
increases the relative value of that alternative in subsequent choice sets. Addiction involves additional 
properties. First, due to preoccupation and/or physical dependence, the agent suffers costs if the habituated 
alternative is not chosen. Second, the addict incurs further costs in efforts to reduce expected future 
consumption of the addictive target. The second property rules out the possibility of a “contented addict.” 
This follows the clinical literature in regarding addiction as inherently a disorder. 
2 Phenomenology is the name of the branch of philosophy that studies how mental states “feel” from (as it 
were) “the inside.” For reasons explored by Lyons [1986] and Dennett [1991], we share widespread doubt 
among scientists and economists that phenomenological reports should be regarded as observations of data, 
though obviously the reports themselves are data. But we see no harm in letting such reports inspire 
hypotheses and conjectures. 
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following a series of failed attempts: they must learn from experience how to design personal 
policies that lack undermining loopholes. This pattern is well documented in the empirical clinical 
literature on addiction (Heyman [2009]). Such complexities cannot be directly modeled using only 
simple utility functions that rank or weight (smoking, abstinence) as outcomes and impose 
exponential intertemporal discounting.  
Stepping outside of economics, ideas along the lines of those of Schelling [1978][1980][1984] 
have been pursued more systematically by Ainslie [1975][1992][2001]. From his perspective as a 
clinical psychiatrist and behavioral researcher, he distinguishes a range of strategies by which people 
commonly attempt to increase the likelihood that their future behavior will correspond to policies 
they lay down for themselves in the present. The strategy to which Ainslie has devoted the most 
attention is referred to as reward bundling. He presents this as a variety of mental framing, in which a 
person at time t1 represents a binary choice as being drawn from a set of two extended sequences of 
rewards Rt1, Rt2, … Rtk and Rt'1, Rt'2, … Rt'k, rather than from a set of two discrete states of affairs 
Rti or Rt'i that are independent of subsequent alternatives. For example, if a person faces a choice 
between going jogging in today’s wind and rain or staying in bed for another hour, she might frame 
the choice as merely applying to her activities and experiences over the hour in question. 
Alternatively, the person might represent herself as choosing between being two different kinds of 
people, over a time frame that extends indefinitely into the future: is she the sort of person who jogs 
every day come what may, or the sort of person who jogs only when conditions are just right? If the 
person finds staying warm in bed to be a more pleasant prospect for the immediate hour than a cold, 
wet, jog, and nothing else is at stake, then she has no reason to choose the latter. But some people in 
such circumstances successfully exhort themselves to get up and brave the elements. Ainslie 
hypothesizes that the key to explanation, at least in many cases, is that the person may be motivated 
to believe that she will be resolute about maintaining fitness in the future. But that belief would be in 
tension with the belief she will have to adopt about herself if she stays in bed today, if she then 
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chooses to view her decision today as the best available predictive evidence about how she will 
behave tomorrow or next week We might thus assign to the agent a standing utility function 
according to which she prefers to jog most of the time. Her choice today is then predicted by 
assigning to her a belief that she increases the probability of realizing this preference if she chooses 
to jog today because, she believes, today’s decision has a (typically non-deterministic) causal 
influence on future choices. 
Choosing between jogging now and sleeping in now is one sort of choice that people 
obviously make often when choices are vulnerable to procrastination. But more than a figure of 
speech is involved in saying that choosing between being generally conscientious about fitness and 
being generally lazy is also a sort of choice people really make, extended over time rather than at the 
moment of discrete choice. The point goes deeper than the familiar one that people might 
subjectively frame their choices in varying ways. Economic theory is flexible with respect to who the 
decision-making agent is (i.e., an individual, a household, a company, a country) and the horizons 
over which choices are made. No plausible general theoretical principle in economics requires an 
atomistic ontology of choices, according to which a bundled choice is always identical to a mere 
unstructured sequence of discrete choices. Applied to our example, an “event atomist”3 would insist 
that the choice to “be the jogging type” is simply identical with the choice to jog at t1 and the choice 
to jog at t2 and, … the choice to jog at tk. But such insistence would amount to forcing metaphysical 
dogma on economic modeling. The person’s decision not to jog on her birthday is consistent with 
her decision to be the kind of person who jogs rather than sleeps in, weather notwithstanding. But 
reduction of the bundled choice event to the set of discrete choice events provides no formal basis 
for recognizing this consistency, relative to the quite different case where the person goes back to 
sleep after merely framing the thought “to hell with being virtuous.”  
                                                 
3 This concept has been rigorously studied by philosophers, such as Davidson [1980], but we will not detour 
here into these details. 
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So much for a priori philosophizing. Before we can decide how seriously we ought to take 
these reflections in modeling real behavior for designing economic experiments, we need to know 
something we hitherto do not: whether bundling choices has detectible and reproducible effects 
under carefully incentivized conditions.  
In psychology, the earliest parametric experiments on incentivized choice were performed 
with animal subjects. Herrnstein [1961] conducted an experiment in which pigeons chose between 
two possible reward schedules. He found that their relative frequency of choice approximately 
equaled the relative frequency of reinforcement of each schedule. Herrnstein’s finding is known as 
the matching law, because the relative rate of responding on a key matches the relative rate of 
reinforcement. Inspired by the original matching law, additional factors that affect the relative 
distribution of behavior were examined. Chung and Herrnstein [1967] studied how delay affects 
choices and found that the relative frequency of responses, again in pigeons, matches the relative 
immediacy of reinforcement. The introduction of delayed rewards confronted the researchers with 
the possible tension between animals’ preference for larger rewards over smaller ones, on the one 
hand, and their preference for earlier rewards over later ones, on the other hand. Evidently these 
two choice tendencies are in conflict when subjects have to choose between smaller, sooner (SS) 
rewards and larger, later (LL) rewards. Ainslie [1974] pointed out that the matching law implies 
reversal of preference between LL and SS rewards as a function of delay, and speculated that this 
might create an incentive for pre-commitment to LL alternatives. This pre-commitment was 
observed using both differential rates of pecking by pigeons (Rachlin and Green [1972]) and single 
choices. Specifically, Ainslie [1974] found that pigeons are more likely to choose LL over SS when at 
a distance from both, if this choice blocked them from facing options to choose SS over LL when 
close to SS. 
Ainslie [1975][1992][2001] understands choice bundling as a solution to problems of 
dynamic choice inconsistency that can arise when agents discount future rewards non-exponentially. 
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Thus, evidence for such discounting might feature in explanations of choice bundling, if there are in 
fact bundled choices to be observed in the first place. Put another way Ainslie’s explanation gains 
some empirical support, though not decisive confirmation, if non-exponential discounting and 
choice bundling are observed to systematically co-occur. To date we have such evidence only for 
rats (Ainslie and Monterosso [2003]). Avowed evidence in the case of people is limited to two 
experiments: Kirby and Guastello [2001] and Hofmeyr, Ainslie, Charlton and Ross [2010]. However, 
both of these experiments suffered from crucial methodological limitations, sufficient to defeat any 
claim that bundled choice has been observed in people. We discuss them in comparison to our 
design in section 8.  
The experiment we report here compares observations of choices embedded in series with 
choices not so embedded. We employ treatments that allow us to control for effects of immediacy 
or “viscerality” (Loewenstein [1996]), and varying reward magnitudes. Our analysis allows for 
subject heterogeneity as between exponential, hyperbolic (Mazur [1987], and quasi-hyperbolic 
(Phelps and Pollack [1968] and Laibson [1997]) discounting, and is tested against a Luce 
interpretation of behavioral error. In light of these methodological refinements, we report the first 
valid inference of reward bundling in humans from properly controlled observations. 
Section 2 reviews models of discounting, section 3 explains our basic experimental design, 
section 4 documents experimental procedures, section 5 considers various analytical methods to 
apply to the data we collect, section 6 presents results, section 7 discusses the main findings, and 
section 8 compares previous experiments with humans. Section 9 concludes by discussing 
implications of this analysis and sketches of new research topics that open for study by economists 




 2. Models of Discounting 
 Ainslie [1992][ 2001] argues that choice bundling is the most common strategy by which 
people manage the consequences of hyperbolic discounting, which he takes to be the natural, 
baseline, structure of intertemporal discounting in animals, including humans. Analytically, the 
relationship between non-exponential discounting and choice bundling admits of two general 
interpretations, between which we wish to remain agnostic. We explain the basis for both alternative 
interpretations and our neutrality among them after reviewing the models of discounting we employ 
in analyzing our experimental data.  
Several models of time preferences have been proposed by economists and psychologists to 
describe observed choice in SS/LL decisions. The discount factor D equates the present utility of a 
reward with its future value for a given time horizon τ : U(xt ) = DU(xt +τ),  where U(xt) is the 
utility of the reward x  if received at time t, and U(xt +τ) is the utility of the reward x  if received at 
the later time t + τ.  The model is general in the sense that it does not assume any specific 
functional form for the instantaneous utility function U or the discount function D. Most models of 
time preference specify the discount factor D in a way that imposes costs for delaying the reward x 
from t to t + τ.  The rate of devaluation per time unit can be derived from the various specifications 
of the discount factor D, and is denoted by d. The general model allows for the special case where 
U(∙) is linear. We consider four major models of time preferences, although many others have been 
proposed: see Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2014b] for a detailed review.  
The exponential discounting model is the standard representation of time preference. It was 
introduced by Samuelson [1937], although he did not propose it as an empirical hypothesis about 
any hypothesized latent structures. In the exponential model the discount factor is DE(τ) 
=1/(1+δ)τ, in discrete time units.4 Like all discounting models, the exponential model incorporates 
                                                 
4 The specification in continuous time shows why the model is called “exponential”: DE(τ)=exp(−δτ). 
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the assumption that time delay is costly: the utility of a reward received later is diminished compared 
to the same reward received sooner. However, exponential discounting assumes that decline in 
utility occurs at a constant rate d = δ. Hence it may be viewed as assuming a constant variable cost 
of time delay and no fixed cost. 
Strotz [1965] drew attention to a “preference reversal” pattern in which individuals might 
reverse SS/LL decisions made at time t as they approach time t + τ, exhibiting less and less patience 
as time t + τ  approaches. To allow for this pattern, Ainslie [1975] proposed that latent time 
discounting mechanisms in animals, including humans, are best described by the hyperbolic discounting 
model. Hyperbolic discounting still assumes variable costs of delay. However, unlike exponential 
discounting, hyperbolic discounting does not assume that variable costs of delay are constant. 
Ainslie proposed a non-parameterized specification of the discount factor  that describes this non-
constant pattern DH1(τ)=1/τ, which implies the discount rate dH1(τ)=τ(1/τ)−1. Specifications of 
the hyperbolic model with parameters that allow for behavioral estimation have been suggested, 
such as the Mazur [1987] specification DH2(τ)=1/(1+Kτ), for some parameter K, implying the 
discount rate dH2(τ)=(1+Kτ)(1/τ)−1.  An agent whose time preferences are described by 
hyperbolic discounting will show declining discount rates with an increasing horizon. The closer a 
reward is in time, the steeper is the discounting gradient between its present and future value. Such 
preferences allow for preference reversals. 
Another deviation from the exponential model is quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The model was 
originally introduced by Phelps and Pollack [1968] for inter-generational transfers, and adopted by 
Laibson [1997]for inter-temporal choices within individual people. It has sometimes been 
hypothesized as describing latent valuation structures driven by appetites aroused exclusively by 
immediate reward prospects that stimulate sense organs: see Loewenstein [1996] and McClure et al. 
[2004]. Economists more often use it as a more tractable stand-in for less convenient hyperbolic 




DQH(τ)=1 at τ = 0 and DQH(τ)=β⁄(1+δ)τ  for τ > 0.  The quasi-hyperbolic model has a jump-
discontinuity in the discount factor at τ = 0 and behaves thereafter like the exponential model. The 
model implies the discount rate dQH(τ)=[β/(1+δ)τ](-1⁄τ)−1. The parameter β introduces a fixed 
cost component to time delay that is absent in exponential and hyperbolic discounting. If the fixed 
cost parameter β  > 0 takes a value strictly less than 1 it reduces the utility of the reward by a fixed 
proportion of the utility of the principal, as soon as any delay occurs.5 After this initial cost of time 
delay wears off, the discount rate converges towards δ.6  
The final discounting model we consider views agents as perceiving time in a distorted way. 
This perception is comparable to probability weighting in decision making under risk: in an 
intertemporal context, agents are modeled as “speeding up” or “slowing down” their perception of 
time horizons. One specification is due to Read [2001], based on the Weibull distribution: 
DW(τ)=exp(−δτ(1⁄s)), for δ  > 0 and s  > 0.  The parameter s  is responsible for the “speeding 
up” or “slowing down” of perceived time horizons, so that when s  < 1 perceived horizons τ  > 1 
are longer than the actual horizon, and vice versa when s  > 1.7 The perceived time is then 
discounted exponentially, and hence this Weibull specification collapses to the exponential model 
when s  = 1.  
These discounting models are all understood, at least by economists, as models of aspects of 
preference. Most economists understand preferences as revealed by choices. This Revealed 
Preference Theory (RPT) understanding admits of two general interpretations, which Ross [2014] 
                                                 
5 An alternative specification of the fixed cost, due to Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter [2010], is directly in terms 
of some reward level x* that must be received to compensate for any time delay. This specification has 
significantly different predictions to the quasi-hyperbolic model: as the stakes increase, the effect of the 
fixed cost of time delay becomes smaller and smaller, whereas they stay the same with the quasi-hyperbolic 
model since they are a fixed proportion of the principal in that model. 
6 In empirical work it is possible to see estimates in which β  > 1, corresponding to a setting in which the 
experimenter is offering subjects a cheaper savings or commitment device than the field counterpart. The 
conventional a priori expectation, absent these considerations, is that β  ≤ 1. 
7 This specification is sensitive to the units with which ߬ is measured, since these effects are reversed if τ < 1. 
We always specify discrete time intervals in which τ = 1 is the smallest time interval considered. 
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labels “mathematical” and “empirical” RPT respectively.8 According to mathematical RPT, defined 
by the axioms of Weak or Strong RPT (Houthakker [1950]), preferences are extensionally identical 
with choices in the temporal limit. This renders it analytically impossible to represent some choices 
as involving errors, which in turn makes it difficult to coherently represent preference reversals of 
the kind made possible by non-exponential discounting as constituting problems that agents might 
be motivated to circumvent. 
In the face of this difficulty we might appeal to empirical RPT, where the conditions for 
construction of ordinal utility functions are given by the axioms of Generalized RPT (Afriat [1967]) 
and applied so as to understand preferences as rationalized descriptions of patterns of choices that 
can include errors. On this interpretation of the relationship between preferences and choices, we 
would say that choice bundling can give rise to exponential discounting. 
On the other hand, most psychologists, including Ainslie [1992][2001], along with some 
economists who subscribe to a revisionist interpretation of behavioral economics, understand 
preferences as latent states. On this interpretation, choice bundling is the most empirically important 
of several possible mechanisms for choosing consistently over time despite the hypothesized 
persistence of latent non-exponential discounting. This latent discounting structure is cited to 
explain why similar agents facing similar decisions who do not bundle choices are more likely to 
choose inconsistently over time. This understanding of discounting as separable from observed 
choice has motivated efforts to identify discounting structures on the basis of non-behavioral 
evidence. McClure et al. [2004] and Glimcher et al. [2007] interpret their respective neuroimaging 
experiments as providing such evidence,9 but do not attempt to link it to other evidence, behavioral 
or otherwise, of choice bundling.  
                                                 
8 Hands [2013] provides a deep and reflective survey of the broader research program of RPT. 
9 The two sets of researchers offer divergent interpretations of the neural response patterns they view as 
encoding non-exponential discounting in subjects’ brains. 
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On both the psychologists’ understanding and the empirical revealed preference theorist’s 
understanding, we should expect to observe correlation between dispositions to bundle choices and 
evidence of non-exponential discounting in un-bundled choices. Thus testing for such correlations 
in suitably controlled conditions entails a general hypothesis that is neutral as between the 
psychologists’ and the revealed preference theorists’ interpretations of the conjectured relationship 
between choice bundling and intertemporal discounting. Observation of the hypothesized 
correlation would be compatible with the possibility that some or all people sometimes bundle 
choices for reasons unrelated to intertemporal discounting. Such observation would, however, 
provide motivation for facing the more challenging design task of trying to identify causal 
relationships between choice bundling and discounting dispositions, of the kind characterized by 
Ainslie [1992][2001] on the basis of his phenomenological reflections. Our investigation is 
conducted in the spirit of the reminder that experiments make it possible “to range beyond the 
confines of current theory to establish empirical regularities which can enable theorists to see in 
advance what are the difficult problems on which it is worth their while to look” (Smith [1994; 
p.114]). 
 
 3. Experimental Design 
 Our experiment consisted of eight treatment conditions, each conducted in a separate 
laboratory session. Four of the treatments served as control treatments for specific inferences, and 
allow us to account for the possibility of both non-exponential discounting and the magnitude 
effect.  The other four treatments served as our bundling treatments, and presented different types 
of bundled choices.  The experimental design is summarized in Table 1 and more fully explained 
below.  
 In each treatment subjects made many choices between SS or LL amounts of money. The 
task presentation followed a multiple-price list (MPL) format for the elicitation of time preferences, 
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introduced by Coller and Williams [1999]. Each subject faced ten decision screens, and each decision 
screen comprised seven decision rows. Hence each subject made 70 binary decisions in total. An 
appendix documents all parameters of the choice battery. 
Treatment FED0 was the initial control, and all other treatments were variations of this 
treatment. The SS amounts presented to subjects were $10, $30, $60, $100 and $300. The SS 
amounts were to be paid on the day of the experimental session, so there was a zero front-end delay. 
The LL amounts were to be paid 28 days after the session. The LL amounts were calculated by 
applying an annual interest rate from the day of the SS payout to the day of the LL payout. The 
annual interest rates ranged from 5 percent to 500 percent, and were not displayed to subjects. A 
typical decision screen from FED0 is presented in Figure 1. 
 The SS amount, $100 in Figure 1, remains constant across all decision rows of a given 
decision screen. The LL amount increases with each decision row within a given decision screen, 
since a higher interest rate was applied to each subsequent row. The payout dates are highlighted and 
the current date is circled on the calendar at the top of the decision screen in order to provide a 
visual aid. In each decision row the subject stated a preference for the SS or LL option. Each choice 
was made by clicking a button under the preferred option, resulting in the preferred option being 
highlighted. The hypothetical subject in Figure 1 chose the SS option in the first four decision rows 
and the LL option from row 5 onward. 
Because hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting specifications predict that discount 
rates decline with the time horizon, we included additional control treatments to allow for this 
possibility. By varying the front-end delay (FED), we are able to estimate structural forms of non-
exponential discounting models following Anderson, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2014b]. 
Treatment FED1 introduced a front-end delay of one day to all choices. That is, any SS payment 
would take place on the day after the experimental session and any LL payment would be made 29 
days after the session.  Treatment FED35 introduced an even longer front-end delay of 35 days, 
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yielding SS payments 35 days after the session and LL payments 63 days after the session.  Figure 2 
exhibits a typical decision screen from treatment FED35. In Figure 2 the day of the decision is again 
circled on the calendar, and the two dates of delayed payment are shaded orange, to make the SS/LL 
tradeoff and the FED as transparent as possible. In both the FED1 and FED35 treatments, the 
monetary amounts and the span of 28 days between the SS and LL dates remained the same as in 
the FED0 treatment.  
Another theoretical consideration addressed by the design is the hypothesized magnitude effect. 
This effect refers to a behavioral regularity commonly reported in the psychological literature that 
humans tend to exhibit lower implied discount rates when payoffs are larger. The empirical evidence 
supporting the magnitude effect is not as convincing as many believe, as documented by Andersen, 
Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2013]. Nonetheless, we evaluate the potential impact of this confound 
by varying the principal significantly within each session. This provides a rich, within-subject control 
across all sessions and treatments, and which we can explicitly allow for in our structural analysis. As 
noted above, the principal was $10, $30, $60, $100 and $300 for different choices for each subject. 
The treatments discussed thus far are necessary to allow us to control for the effects of 
varying FED and reward magnitude on the inferred discount rates. But they do not allow us to test 
for bundling behavior: they only establish a clean baseline. To test for bundling, we must present 
subjects with sequences of time-delayed choices.10 The treatments that follow continue the use of 
ten decision screens with seven decision rows each, but introduce multiple SS/LL choices per 
decision row. These treatment conditions are, henceforth, collectively referred to as bundling 
treatments. 
                                                 
10 These choices are over non-stochastic amounts of money. If they had been over risky lotteries, one would 
need to account for “correlation aversion,” which is an interaction between risk preferences and time 
preferences that arises when one allows non-separable intertemporal utility functions. Andersen, Harrison, 
Lau and Rutström [2018] review the theory, and develop an experimental design to estimate correlation 
aversion. Many of the field applications of bundling do involve risky lotteries, of course, so this extension 
and complication is likely to be an important one for future research. 
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Treatment Free2 introduced a series of two decisions per row, with each atomic decision 
consisting of SS and LL options as before. Figure 3 shows a typical Free2 decision screen.  In a 
given decision row, the two SS monetary amounts are identical and the two LL monetary amounts 
are identical, but the payout dates differ across the four options. As in treatment FED0, the earlier 
SS amount was to be paid on the day of the experimental session and the earlier LL amount was due 
28 days later, and both are shaded as orange on the calendar. And as in treatment FED35, the later 
SS amount was to be paid 35 days after the experimental session and the later LL amount was due 
63 days after the session, and both are shaded as blue on the calendar to differentiate them from the 
earlier SS/LL choice. As in all treatments, the horizon between the SS and LL dates within a given 
atomic choice was set constant at 28 days.  
Treatment Free2 implements a free choice condition. Subjects were free to choose either the SS 
or LL option in each choice independent from the other choice made in the same row. For example, 
in Figure 3, we see in the first decision row that the hypothetical subject chose the SS option for the 
first choice in the sequence and then chose the LL option for the second choice in the sequence.   
In contrast to the Free2 treatment, the Forced2 treatment imposed a forced choice condition.  
The Forced2 treatment is identical to the Free2 treatment except that all choices in a given row were 
forced to be either SS or LL uniformly.  That is, if a subject selected the SS (LL) option for one of 
the choices in a row, then the SS (LL) option was automatically and simultaneously selected for the 
other choice in the same row.  
Finally, two additional treatments are included in the experimental design to extend the 
possibility of choice bundling to a series of three decisions. Treatment Free3 is another free choice 
condition. It is equivalent to treatment Free2, with the addition of a third choice to each choice 
sequence.  In treatment Free3 each choice row comprises three atomic choices: the first choice in 
the sequence is between an SS amount payable the day of the session and an LL amount payable 28 
days later; the next choice is between an SS amount in 35 days versus an LL amount 63 days; and the 
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last choice continues the established date pattern with the SS amount in 70 days and the LL amount 
in 98 days. Similarly, the Forced3 treatment introduced a forced choice condition that was otherwise 
identical to treatment Free3. Subjects in treatment Forced3 were forced to choose the same option 
for all three decisions within a given choice sequence. The choice of SS or LL could differ across 
decision rows but not within rows: we did not enforce single switch points. A typical screen for 
treatment Forced3 is presented in Figure 4. 
 
4. Experimental Procedures 
The sample consisted of 230 undergraduate students at Georgia State University (GSU) 
across eight sessions.11 A participation payment of $5 was paid to all subjects, regardless of their 
choices in the decision task. The payouts from the choice task were determined independently for 
each subject. After completing the task and the subsequent demographic survey, each subject was 
approached by a research assistant. The subject then rolled a 10-sided die to select one of the ten 
decision screens from the task. After the screen was selected, the subject rolled the 10-sided die again, 
until a number between 1 and 7 came up, to determine one of the seven decision rows on the chosen 
decision screen. The subject’s decision in the specified row was then considered for payout. Subject 
payments for the experiment totaled $17,802, with a per-subject average just over $71.12   
                                                 
11 The participants were recruited by email invitation, after registering into the subject pool of the 
Experimental Economics Center at GSU and arrived at the laboratory without knowing the exact nature of 
the experiment. Each subject drew a random number and was seated at a computer station corresponding 
with the random draw. Detailed instructions, provided in an appendix, were handed to them to review 
before being read aloud. The subjects were invited to ask questions to clarify the decision task; in practice, 
very few questions were asked. After any questions had been answered the choice task began. Once the task 
was completed, the subjects were prompted to complete a demographic survey. The payout selection 
procedure concluded each experimental session. 
12 To limit extreme experimental costs an additional stochastic procedure determined whether large amounts 
would be paid out.  In treatments FED0, FED1, and FED35, if the selected decision was less than $100, 
the amount would be paid for certain.  If the selected option was $100 or more, the subjects were asked to 
roll the 10-sided die one more time. If the outcome was 1, the subjects would be paid the specified amount 
on the date indicated by their decision. If any other number came up on the roll, the subject would not be 
paid for the task. These procedures were explained to subjects in the instructions. Note that this procedure 
did not incentivize subjects to choose SS amounts for security, because no LL amounts over $100 had 
corresponding SS amounts under $100. The payment procedure for treatments Free2, Forced2, Free3, and 
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Only the participation payment of $5 was paid in cash, and at the end of the experimental 
session. All payouts from the decision task were paid using the online payment service PayPal. Even 
if a selected payment was due on the day of the experimental session, the amount was paid via 
PayPal later that day. This common payment procedure kept transaction costs constant across 
treatments and across SS and LL choices.   
Whenever an initial payment was due, a subject received an email notification one day in 
advance. No such notification was sent when second or third payments were due, since we assumed 
that the subject had become sufficiently familiar with the payment procedure. The initiation of each 
transfer on the payment date led to another email notification, automatically sent by PayPal, which 
informed the subject that the amount was available and could be claimed.13  
 
 5. Analytical Methods 
 
The analysis of the choice data adopts complementary descriptive and structural methods. 
These methods allow different intuition and insights.  
The simplest descriptive technique we employ is the use of flexible polynomial regression 
displays to examine the “reduced form” effects of various covariates on the probability of choosing 
LL. Several regression models are used to relate choice characteristics to behavior, without 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
Forced3 was similar. However, if the individual chosen options in the decision row selected for payment 
were less than $100, the entire choice sequence (i.e., all selected options in the decision row) would be paid 
with certainty to the subject on the specified dates. If the individual chosen options in the selected row were 
$100 or more, the subject would roll a 10-sided die again. If the outcome of the roll was 1, the subject was 
paid on the specified dates for all decisions made in this row. Otherwise, they would not be paid for the 
task.  
13 In a few rare cases a subject failed to claim her payment. In this situation, the subject again received an 
email notification that explained that she had failed to claim her payment and that PayPal would return the 
fund to the experimenters if the amount remained unclaimed after a period of 30 days. It was conveyed to 
these subjects that the money would be sent again for a second 30 day period. The PayPal transfers would 
be terminated only if the subjects failed to claim their money a second time. If this happened, the subject 
would have to contact the experimenter, using a previously given email address, to arrange payment. The 
vast majority of transfers went as planned. Only eight payments were left unclaimed by five different 
subjects, after the period for all payments had passed. One participant left three payments unclaimed, 
another left two payments unclaimed, and three participants left one payment unclaimed. 
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incorporating theoretical assumptions about how exactly decisions are made. Hence these models 
and displays are viewed as descriptive.  
The most informative econometric approach we adopt is the direct estimation by maximum 
likelihood of structural models of the data generating processes underlying observed behavior. This 
approach allows us to identify the processes at work in a way that makes conceptual sense, and 
informs our thinking about those processes rather than simply describing them. The methods are 
familiar and well-established, so we summarize here; an appendix provides details. 
There are three key features of our structural approach.  
First, we control for diminishing marginal utility in our inferences about time preferences. It 
follows from Jensen’s Inequality that estimating a more concave curvature of the instantaneous 
utility function results in lower inferred discount rates for the same observed choice data. As our 
subjects were drawn from a pool in which we have measured distributions of risk preferences, based 
on choices amongst non-hypothetical lotteries on numerous occasions, we based these estimates on 
previous data from this pool.14 Following Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2014b], we 
estimated risk preferences assuming that choice patterns conformed more closely either to Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT) or Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) due to Quiggin [1982] using a Prelec [1998] 
two-parameter probability weighting function. In each case all we need to infer from the model of 
risk preferences is an estimate of U″, the second-order derivative with respect to experimental 
income, whether or not this comes from an EUT or RDU model. Our estimates of the utility 
functions are joint with our estimates of the discounting functions, following Andersen, Harrison, 
Lau and Rutström [2008]. 
                                                 
14 See Coller, Harrison and Rutström [2012] for a full discussion of this methodology. The risk preference 




Second, we allow for a range of discounting functions, including exponential, hyperbolic, 
quasi-hyperbolic, and Weibull, following Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2014b]. We are 
therefore not tied to a particular specification of the alternative to exponential discounting. 
Finally, following Coller, Harrison and Rutström [2012], Schuhr [2016] and Harrison, 
Hofmeyr, Ross and Swarthout [2018], we employ mixture models to characterize heterogeneity of 
decision-making processes with respect to a fraction of choices to be characterized by Exponential 
discounting and a fraction characterized by one of the specified non-exponential forms. 
 
 6. Results 
 
 6.1 Descriptive Results 
The first local polynomial regression, which concentrates on the choices from treatments 
FED0, FED1 and FED35, is presented in Figure 5. For each magnitude of the principal it shows 
how the fraction of LL choices varies with nominal annualized interest rate. The horizontal line at 
the 50 percent mark indicates where the observed choices are evenly split between SS and LL. 
Figure 5 illustrates that the fraction of LL choices increases with the nominal annual interest rate. 
One can also observe the general tendency that the fraction of LL choices increases with the 
magnitude of the principal. That is, the observed behavior appears to be consistent with a “magnitude 
effect,” since more subjects choose LL when the magnitude of SS is higher. Only for principals of 
$60 and $100 can we see some deviations from this general tendency. 
Figure 6 displays the fraction of LL choices across the three FED treatments and five 
principals, allowing one to see the interaction between the FED and principals. We observe a 
general tendency that the fraction of LL choices increases with the FED; more subjects choose LL 
when the delay of SS increases from no delay (FED0) to 1 day (FED1) and 35 days (FED35). 
Exponential discounting predicts that the fraction of LL choices should be the same across the three 
control treatments for each principal, whereas hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting predicts 
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that the fraction of LL choices increases when the FED increases. The results are therefore 
suggestive of some support in favor of hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting for the three 
control treatments across the five principals.  
 The next step is to investigate whether there are significant differences between the data 
from the three control treatments and the free conditions of the bundling treatments, Free2 and Free3. , 
These are the central treatments that allow us to test for the effects of bundling. 
 Figure 7 considers the similarity of the first and second choices in treatment Free2. There is 
no significant difference between the first and second choices for low and high principals, 
respectively: the first and second choice patterns are almost identical for each of the five principals. 
This result is consistent with a tendency towards more exponential discounting in these treatments. 
 A similar picture emerges for the first, second, and third choices in the other free condition, 
treatment Free3. Figure 8 suggests the absence of significant differences between first, second and 
third choices. From this we infer that discount rates in each of these choices are the same, although 
we cannot infer that they are consistent with exponential discounting. For that we need to model the 
discounting processes explicitly. 
 
 6.2 Structural Estimation Results  
 Discounting parameters must be estimated as conditional on risk parameters, since errors 
from estimates of the utility function propagate into discounting estimates. The structural analysis of 
the risk data applies a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) specification. We estimate a single 
EUT model and three RDU models, employing a power probability weighting function, an inverse-S 
function, or the Prelec probability weighting function. Based on the statistical significance of the 
estimated parameters and the log-likelihood value, the RDU specification with Prelec probability 
weighting provides the best model of the choice data. Therefore, this model of risk preferences is 
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used for the joint estimation of time preference models. 
 To assess the data against the exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
models, the initial focus will be on the control treatments FED0, FED1, and FED35. 
The estimated annualized discount rate for the exponential model is the parameter δ, and is 
187% with a 95% confidence interval between 136% and 239%. 
The parameter K  for the hyperbolic discounting model is estimated to be 1.16 with a 95% 
confidence interval between 0.94 and 1.37. The annualized discount rate implied by the hyperbolic 
discounting model declines from 217% with a horizon of 1 day to 47 % when the horizon is 
extended to 5 years. 
The estimated value of the quasi-hyperbolic parameter ߚ is 0.97 and significantly different 
from 1, with a 95 percent confidence interval between 0.95 and 0.99: a formal t-test rejects the null 
hypothesis of exponential discounting (two-sided p-value of 0.033). The quasi-hyperbolic δ is 
estimated to be 129% with a 95% confidence interval between 73% and 184%. 
The Weibull discounting parameter s is estimated to be 1.33 with a 95% confidence interval 
between 0.96 and 1.70. A formal hypothesis test shows that ݏ is not significantly different from 1 at 
the 5 percent level of significance (p-value of 0.076). Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
exponential discounting from the perspective of the Weibull specification. 
We consider next estimates of two mixture models using responses from the three control 
treatments (FED0, FED1 and FED35) and the four bundling treatments (Free2, Forced2, Free3 and 
Forced3). In each mixture model controls are included for the various principals used, allowing them 
to affect all parameters of the discounting functions. 
The first model is a mixture of exponential and hyperbolic discounting, and the second 
model is a mixture of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Pooling over all responses we 
find a roughly even split between the exponential and hyperbolic discounting functions. The 
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estimated value of the exponential mixture probability is 0.53 with a standard error of 0.14, and we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that it is equal to 0.5 (p-value of 0.808).  The estimated annualized 
exponential discount rate is equal to 64%, and the annualized hyperbolic discount rate varies 
between 576% for the 1-day horizon and 60% for the 5-year horizon. 
Turning to the mixture model incorporating exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting, 
we find that the exponential mixture probability is 0.586 with a standard error of 0.091, and we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that it is equal to 0.5 (p-value = 0.341). The annualized exponential 
discount rate is equal to 75%. We can reject the null hypothesis that β=1 for the quasi-hyperbolic 
model (p-value < 0.001), and the predicted annualized quasi-hyperbolic discount rate varies between 
3,020% for the 7-day time horizon and 345% for the 5-year time horizon. 
 Table 2 reports the estimates of key parameters from the two mixture models with controls 
for bundling treatments and magnitude effects.15 Panel A shows the results for the mixture model 
between exponential and hyperbolic discounting. We observe a significant effect of the bundling 
treatment on the mixture probability: the marginal effect of bundling on the exponential mixture 
probability is +44.2 percentage points with a p-value of 0.021. Subjects in non-bundled treatments 
have an exponential mixture probability of 29.5%, whereas the exponential mixture probability is 
73.7% in bundled treatments. We also observe an increase in the estimated exponential and 
hyperbolic discount rates in the bundling treatment, but the marginal effects are not statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level. 
 The treatment variable second is an indicator for bundling treatments with two decision tasks 
in comparison to bundling treatments with three decision tasks, which is the default in the statistical 
model. The marginal effect of having two decision tasks, compared to three, on the exponential 
mixture probability is negative and significant with a p-value of 0.013. Hence, the exponential 
                                                 
15 An appendix contains complete estimates, including estimates for the magnitude effects. For present 
purposes these are “nuisance parameters” and are simply included to control for possible magnitude effects. 
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mixture probability is significantly higher when three decision tasks are bundled instead of two 
decision tasks. We also observe a significant marginal effect of the forced treatment variable on the 
exponential mixture probability and in the direction one would expect: subjects are constrained in 
the forced treatment to make the same choices across the (two or three) bundled decision tasks, which 
rules out non-exponential discounting.16 
Panel B in Table 2 shows the results for the mixture model between exponential and quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. There is again a significant effect of the bundling treatment on the mixture 
probability: the marginal effect on the exponential mixture probability is +42.9 percentage points 
with a p-value of 0.035. Subjects in non-bundled treatments have an exponential mixture probability 
of 29.2%, and the exponential mixture probability is 73.6% in bundled treatments. We also observe 
positive marginal effects of the bundling treatment on the estimated parameters in the two 
discounting functions, although none of the marginal effects are significant at conventional 
significance levels. The marginal effect of second on the exponential mixture probability is -23.6 
percentage points and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.017. 
The main conclusion from Panels A and B of Table 2 is that allowing bundling leads to 
dramatic increases in the fraction of choices better characterized by exponential discounting. 
Moreover, these findings are robust to the use of hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting models 
as the alternative to exponential discounting.  
  
                                                 
16 Each subject was presented with five magnitude treatments, embodied in the SS principal: $10, $30, $60, 
$100 and $300. These are within session treatments, and they are used as control variables in the equations 
for exponential and hyperbolic discounting as well as the error term. In the detailed estimates in an 
appendix, we observe magnitude effects on both exponential and hyperbolic discount rates: subjects have 
lower discount rates for higher magnitudes. The marginal effects of the magnitude treatments on the 
hyperbolic discounting parameter are large and statistically significant, whereas the marginal effects of 
magnitude on the exponential discounting parameter are smaller and not statistically significant. 
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 7. Discussion 
 
Descriptive analyses of our experimental data indicate that our subjects’ choice behavior was 
consistent with hypothesized choice bundling. This interpretation is more systematically and 
rigorously supported by our structural model estimation. The evidence is comparably strong for 
both mixture models we consider, one that mixes exponential and hyperbolic discounting models, 
and another that mixes exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. The positive effect of 
multiple SS/LL pairs on the probability of exponential discounting in both models is highly 
significant and robust across a range of treatments motivated by previous theoretical literature. 
Discussions of discounting and bundling in the psychological literature inspired by the work 
of Ainslie [1975][1992][2001] have almost invariably presupposed that people are naturally non-
exponential discounters, and conjectures about bundling in this literature are conditional on this 
assumption. The theoretical background against which we structured our design and interpret our 
results is quite different. The most direct empirical evidence available, from Andersen, Harrison, Lau 
and Rutström [2013][2014b], suggests that either people latently hyperbolically discount but usually 
choose in a way that overcomes this preference17 or often discount exponentially, at least where 
monetary rewards are concerned. Our experiment involves no a priori assumptions about frequencies 
of different time preference structures in our subject population. Of course, if “hyperbolicky” 
(hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic) discounting were absent or rare in the study population, our design 
would not achieve traction with respect to the attempt to determine whether there is a correlation 
between such discounting and choice bundling. 
We observed such a correlation. That is, we observed hyperbolicky choice behavior for some 
subjects, after controlling for diminishing marginal utility, through joint estimation of time and risk 
                                                 
17 This is the theory of Ainslie [2001]. 
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preferences.18 We then independently, and for the first time in human subjects, observed bundling 
that is not conditional on assumptions about discounting, and we found that these behaviors were 
correlated. 
 
 8. Previous Experiments 
 
Previous experimental evidence for humans is limited to two experiments: Kirby and 
Guastello [2001] and Hofmeyr, Ainslie, Charlton and Ross [2010]. However, both of these 
experiments suffered from methodological limitations, sufficient to defeat any claim that bundled 
choice has been unambiguously observed in people. 
Hofmeyr et al. [2010] employed an incentive-incompatible procedure for eliciting baseline 
preferences: they relied on a “titration algorithm” to determine SS/LL tradeoffs based on prior 
responses by the same subject. Harrison and Rutström [2008; §1.5] discuss the problems with 
incentive-compatibility of comparable titration designs to elicit risk preferences. Nor do Hofmeyr et 
al. [2010] correct inferences about discount rates for the effect of diminishing marginal utility, 
implying a serious and known mis-specification stressed by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström 
[2008]. 
Kirby and Guastello [2001] employed many design features that are similar to ours in broad 
terms.19 However, they deceived subjects: subjects were informed that they would be contacted 
                                                 
18 This general conclusion is consistent with previous evidence from Coller, Harrison and Rutström [2012] 
for comparable samples of university students in the United States. But it is not consistent with evidence 
from field experiments with adult Danes, reported in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2014b], so it 
is not something that can be always assumed to be present. 
19 The main goal of their experiment was to test whether choices of SS would be reversed when decisions 
were presented as parts of series of repeated decisions. Time horizons between deliveries of SS and LL 
alternatives were held constant, but delays from the experimental sessions were varied. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to three treatment conditions, each of which varied the way in which linkage between 
the elements of the presented series was suggested. In the imposed-linking condition, subjects were forced 
to choose either the SS or the LL option for all decision pairs in the series. In the free-linking condition, 
subjects were informed that they would be contacted again on the specified decision dates, and asked to 
choose from the remaining pairs of the series. Finally, a suggested-linking condition used the same 
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again to choose their preferred options in “future” components of the choice series with which 
they were presented, but these choices were in fact never elicited. They also did not control for 
effects of varying reward magnitudes across experimental conditions, and are forthright (p. 162ff.) 
about the significance of this limitation. They also relied on the Becker, DeGroot and Marschak ( 
BDM) [1964] elicitation method (p.158), which is known to have major behavioral limitations 
despite being theoretically incentive-compatible.20 They did not econometrically correct inferences 
about discount rates for the effect of diminishing marginal utility, leading to the same mis-
specification noted above with respect to Hofmeyr et al. [2010]. They study the observable effects of 
bundling, but those effects could have been generated by many alternative latent processes.21 Finally, 
they reported as a fact in subject instructions the very hypothesis about bundling that is under 
investigation: that a person’s present choices are evidence about how she will choose in future, 
similar situations. Of course this generates a potential “experimenter demand effect” to explain their 
results in this case. 
 
 9. Conclusion 
 
Many experimental and behavioral economists have long been familiar with the 
phenomenology of willpower due to Ainslie [1992][2001], which gives pride of place to an 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
instructions as in the free-linking condition, but added the claim that “the choice that you make now is the 
best indication of how you will choose every time.” 
20 Harrison [1992] discusses the “payoff dominance” problem with the BDM procedure: that it provides very 
poor incentives for precise revelation of present-value certainty equivalents. Rutström [1998] discusses the 
poor ability of the BDM procedure to recover true, “homegrown” values when compared to real-time 
English auctions. And Plott and Zeiler [2005] discuss at length the subject misconceptions that arise when 
using the BDM procedure, and what one has to do in order to train subjects to understand that it is indeed 
incentive-compatible. 
21 We do not interpret a possible effect from a forced link between the decisions as evidence for choice 
bundling. Rather, the inclusion of the Forced2 and Forced3 treatments in our design enables us to 
distinguish the effect that Kirby and Guastello [2001] found from genuine choice bundling that arise when 
subjects are free to vary choices over a sequence, in the Free2 and Free3 treatments. 
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experience he characterizes as choice bundling. Economists can find a clear echo of this idea in the 
work of one of their own tribe, Schelling [1978][1980][1984]. However, whereas other core themes 
emphasized by Ainslie [1992][2001], specifically hyperbolic discounting and strategic bargaining 
among temporally distinct selves, have featured prominently in the economic literature, choice 
bundling has been absent. We conjecture that this is due to the difficulty of designing an experiment 
that could in principle identify choice bundling, if it exists, having deterred previous research. Due to 
the observed heterogeneity of functional forms of discounting, the possible presence of magnitude 
effects, and the fact that discounting rates are known to be biased and inconsistent if diminishing 
marginal utility is not measured and factored into the analysis, choice bundling is intrinsically 
resistant to empirical identification in the absence of structural modeling.  
The experiment and analysis reported here surmounts these barriers. Hence we can report 
that choice bundling, previously exhibited using methodologies that would be regarded as adequate 
by the standards of economists only in rats (Ainslie and Monterosso [2003]), has for the first time 
been observed in people. We suggest that this observation should motivate economists to take up 
the daunting task of building frame-dependence of the ontology of choice alternatives into their 
theoretical repertoire. We call the task “daunting” because it introduces a new class of potential 
endogeneity problems into economic modeling. If a person produces different behavior depending 
on whether she frames a choice as existential (“I choose to be the kind of person who is generally 
conscientious about fitness rather than indulgent about gustatory pleasure”), motivating (“I choose 
to jog today in order to avoid undermining my hope of choosing to jog in the future”) or episodic 
(“I choose not to exercise today”), then the economist setting out to fit her response functions to a 
model must face the considerable nuisance of not being able to treat her choice set as exogenous. 
The ultimate point of the analysis of Ainslie [1992][2001], after all, is that people can willfully 
manage their choice framing.  Indeed, according to him this capacity is constitutive of the real 
phenomenon of willpower. 
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Though the mission is challenging, experience suggests that it would be defeatist to regard it 
as impossible. To invoke a close analogy, Bacharach [2006] proposed that people can voluntarily 
frame their own agency in terms of identification with individualistic or collective utility functions. 
This implies that choice sets in games, and therefore likewise strategy sets, are not exogenously 
given. Few of the reviewers of Bacharach [2006] quarreled with the intuitive psychology underlying 
his claim, or with his catalogue of examples drawn from everyday social life; yet applications of his 
idea in economic studies are rare to nonexistent. The explanation for this is straightforward: 
Bacharach [2006] offered little guidance toward integration of his insight into formal modeling. 
However, Ross [2014, p.291-303] and Hofmeyr and Ross [2018] argue that the limitation has been at 
least partly surmounted by the recent theory of conditional games due to Stirling [2012], which 
shows how the axioms of standard game theory can be expanded to allow for Nash and Nash-Bayes 
equilibrium solutions to be recovered even when players can strategically re-frame their agency in 
response to social relationships and pressures.  
We close by presenting a taste of some of the range of issues to which economists could 
make richer contributions if their model of choice allowed for bundling. We briefly sketch reasons 
for suspecting that the phenomenon is directly implicated in the motivational effectiveness of 
rationalization, in heterogeneous discounting of different classes of consumption goods and 
experiences by the same person, in chronic failures of will, in compulsive resistance to learning from 
experience, and in the experience of free will. The last might look like a topic that is of no concern 
to economists; however, the nature of the experience of free will may explain why most people are 
competent economic agents while being poor natural economists. 
Rationalization. The perception that a much larger reward, or bundle of rewards, depends on a 
current choice puts pressure on a person to either forego a tempting satisfaction or to find some 
reason that the current choice is not a valid test case for the larger prospect. What is commonly 
called rationalization is the activity of distinguishing the case at hand from a larger category. For 
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example, “New Year’s Eve doesn’t count,” “I’ll never have a chance to eat that dish again,” “I’m on 
vacation,” and endless other versions of “just this once.” Without choice bundling and the recursive 
self-prediction to which it gives rise, this legalistic self-governance would be pointless. But are we to 
doubt that people regularly engage in it, and that it influences their choices?  
Heterogeneous intrapersonal discounting. Within limits a person should be able to adopt various 
norms for discounting under varying circumstances, including exponential discounting and no 
discounting at all, as economists indeed sometimes recommend. These limits would be determined 
by the aggregate discounted value of the expected fruits of such a norm, relative to the discounted 
value of individual temptations as they drew near. If a person defines paying more than the prime 
interest rate as a defection from a prudent rule she has adopted, she will be more likely to lapse than 
if she defines paying greater than her current credit card rate as such a defection. The forms of self-
management made possible by choice bundling can be exercised with more or less skill and more or 
less information. 
Chronic failures of will and mental accounts. Serious lapses of will are likely to result in a person’s 
discrimination of the relevant circumstances from the larger bundle that is the basis of willpower. In 
turn this can lead to what are in effect involuntary mental accounts: circumscribed areas of 
dyscontrol in which the person gives up on willpower (“I have to smoke after a meal,” “I can’t get 
myself to speak in public,” etc.). People’s experience of what would seem to be choices as 
involuntary barriers has otherwise puzzled theorists. In fact, we need not deny that these behavioral 
patterns are chosen. But the choices in question are of policies rather than of discrete actions, and 
are not typically proximate in time to the discrete actions. To the extent that an economic model 
cannot represent this, it is apt to mis-predict. 
Compulsive character. A person’s uncertainty about how she will interpret a current choice 
when looking back from the moment of a future choice will create an incentive to give temptations a 
wider berth than sheer calculation would require. If she is especially afraid of impulses and becomes 
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aware of the rationale for this extra caution, she may come to perceive a failure to give such a wide 
berth as itself something of a lapse (Ainslie [1992]). Bodner and Prelec [2001] argue that the 
additional diagnostic utility of such self-signaling motivates drift into poles of scrupulous self-
control or irresistible impulsiveness, a process that has been observed in a two-person analog of the 
intertemporal prisoner’s dilemma by Monterosso, Ainslie, Toppi-Mullen and Gault [2002]. If the 
direction of drift is away from scrupulous self-control, the result may be a chronic circumscribed 
failure of will, as above. 
 “Free will.” Small changes of perceived symbolism, and hence category membership, may 
change the implications of a self-signal, so that a person cannot be absolutely sure of what her 
motivation and hence her choice will be even in the near future.  This will create in turn both the 
introspective opacity and sense of participation in one’s own decisions that have been held to be key 
to the near-universal subjective experience of free will (Ainslie [2011]).  In effect, the experience of 
free will arises from people’s imperfect abilities to identify their own utility functions. The history of 
economic theory shows three broad kinds of response to such indeterminacy of utility specification 
from a focus on discrete choices. One response, forced if utility functions are understood as literal 
summaries of actual choices that must therefore predict all of those choices perfectly or be regarded 
as false, is to declare people “irrational” and abandon the methods and principles of economics in 
favor of psychology (Ariely [2008]). Another response is to construct normative metrics of welfare 
evaluation for individuals that only consider opportunity sets, effectively abandoning any hope of 
using any preference information (Sugden [2004][2018; ch.5]). An alternative response, which 
Harrison and Ross [2018] recommend, involves recognizing that utility functions are constructs that 
most usefully apply to patterns of choice, or what Mill and Marshall sagely called “tendencies.” 
Bundling might be among the fundamental processes that make strong tendencies typical in human 
choice, and thus generate the phenomena that microeconomics is essentially about. 
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Table 1: Experimental Design 
 
 






The choice between a smaller amount “today” (i.e., a front-end delay of 




FED1 The same as FED0, but with a front-end delay of 1 day. 29 
   
FED35 The same as FED0, but with a front-end delay of 35 days.
 
35 
Free2 Two “free” decisions. One as in FED0, one as in FED35.
 
37 
Forced2 Two “forced” decisions. One as in FED0, one as in FED35.
 
33 
Free3 Three “free” decisions. One as in FED0, one as in FED35, and another 
pair of options. 
 
31 
Forced3 Three “forced” decisions. One as in FED0, one as in FED35, and 
another pair of options. 
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Figure 3: Decision Task in Treatment Free2 
 






Figure 4: Decision Screen in Treatment Forced3 
 





















Figure 8: Comparison of First, Second and Third Choices in Treatment Free3 
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Table 2: Estimates of Mixture Models 
 
 









[95% Confidence Interval] 
δ 0.088 0.073 0.232 -0.056 0.231 
K 0.806 0.154 <0.001 0.504 1.108 
πE 0.295 0.138 0.033 0.024 0.566 
πH 0.705 0.138 <0.001 0.434 0.976 
πE bundled 0.442 0.192 0.021 0.066 0.818 
πE second -0.240 0.096 0.013 -0.429 -0.051 
πE forced 0.466 0.233 0.046 0.009 0.924 
δ bundled 0.052 0.100 0.605 -0.145 0.248 
K bundled 0.494 0.805 0.540 -1.084 2.072 
 
 









[95% Confidence Interval] 
δ 0.107 0.083 0.200 -0.056 0.269 
β 0.971 0.011 <0.001 0.949 0.993 
δQH 0.682 0.244 0.005 0.204 1.161 
πE  0.292 0.125 0.020 0.046 0.537 
πH  0.708 0.125 <0.001 0.463 0.954 
πE bundled 0.429 0.203 0.035 0.031 0.828 
πE second -0.236 0.099 0.017 -0.430 -0.042 
πE forced 0.474 0.197 0.016 0.087 0.860 
δ bundled 0.027 0.109 0.804 -0.187 0.241 
β bundled 0.005 0.040 0.894 -0.073 0.083 
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Appendix A: Instructions 
 
In the actual experiments the treatments were named differently than the names used in our text, in 
part to keep the research objective abstract. 
 
Treatments T0, T1 and T3 correspond to what we refer to as FED0, FED and FED35, respectively. 
 
Treatment T2 corresponds to what we refer to as HiMag in Appendix E. 
 
Treatments T4 and T5 correspond to what we refer to as Free2 and Forced2, respectively. 
 




A. Instructions: Treatment FED0 
B_T0 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  The sooner date will always be today, while 
the later date will be some weeks from today. An example of a decision screen is shown below. The dates 




This screen shows seven decisions.  Each decision is presented on a different row.  All decisions 
have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment that today is January 
1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s look at the first decision in the 
example above (the one on the first decision row).  The sooner choice pays $100 today, January 1, 2012 in 
the example, and the later choice pays $109.59 in twenty-eight days from today.  You choose between these 
two options by clicking the button under the option you prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen having seven choices for 
you to make.  You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving to the next decision 
screen.  While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decisions is that the dollar amounts 
of the future payment will change.  However, different decision screens will have different dollar amounts 
and future payment dates. So, you should make sure to pay attention to both the changing dollar amounts 
and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision screens 
by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, 
to pick one decision row on that screen. When you make your choices you will not know which decision 




Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choice you made and the 
payout for that choice. If the payout is smaller (less than $100), you will actually be paid this amount. 
However, if the payout is larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine whether or not 
you are actually paid this amount. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the amount, and on the date that 
you chose to receive it. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn nothing in this task. This roll will be 
at the end of the experiment, and in private, when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you preferred the 
sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown above.  You would then 
roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the row. Suppose the outcome was 5 
and the fifth row is selected, where you preferred a payment of $123.01 in twenty-eight days. Since this 
payment is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the end of the experiment. If the 
outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in twenty-eight days. However, if the outcome is 3, or 
anything other than 1, you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. If you 
receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation from Professor 
Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
 
The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is paid out 
at the end of the experiment as cash.  
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B. Instructions: Treatment FED1 
B_T1 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  The sooner date will always be tomorrow, 
while the later date will be some weeks from today. An example of a decision screen is shown below. The 




This screen shows seven decisions.  Each decision is presented on a different row.  All decisions 
have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment that today is January 
1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s look at the first decision in the 
example above (the one on the first decision row).  The sooner choice pays $100 tomorrow, January 2, 2012 
in the example, and the later choice pays $109.59 in twenty-nine days from today. You choose between 
these two options by clicking the button under the option you prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen having seven choices for 
you to make.  You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving to the next decision 
screen.  While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decisions is that the dollar amounts 
of the future payment will change.  However, different decision screens will have different dollar amounts 
and future payment dates. So, you should make sure to pay attention to both the changing dollar amounts 
and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision screens 
by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, 
to pick one decision row on that screen. When you make your choices you will not know which decision 




Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choice you made and the 
payout for that choice. If the payout is smaller (less than $100), you will actually be paid this amount. 
However, if the payout is larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine whether or not 
you are actually paid this amount. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the amount, and on the date that 
you chose to receive it. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn nothing in this task. This roll will be 
at the end of the experiment, and in private, when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you preferred the 
sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown above.  You would then 
roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the row. Suppose the outcome was 5 
and the fifth row is selected, where you preferred a payment of $123.01 in twenty-nine days. Since this 
payment is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the end of the experiment. If the 
outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in twenty-nine days. However, if the outcome is 3, or 
anything other than 1, you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. If you 
receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation from Professor 
Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
 
The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is paid out 
at the end of the experiment as cash.  
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C. Instructions: Treatment HiMag 
B_T2 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  The sooner date will always be today, while 
the later date will be some weeks from today. An example of a decision screen is shown below. The dates 




This screen shows seven decisions.  Each decision is presented on a different row.  All decisions 
have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment that today is January 
1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s look at the first decision in the 
example above (the one on the first decision row).  The sooner choice pays $300 today, January 1, 2012 in 
the example, and the later choice pays $328.77 in twenty-eight days from today.  You choose between these 
two options by clicking the button under the option you prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen having seven choices for 
you to make.  You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving to the next decision 
screen.  While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decisions is that the dollar amounts 
of the future payment will change.  However, different decision screens will have different dollar amounts 
and future payment dates. So, you should make sure to pay attention to both the changing dollar amounts 
and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision screens 
by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, 
to pick one decision row on that screen. When you make your choices you will not know which decision 




Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choice you made and the 
payout for that choice. If the payout is smaller (less than $300), you will actually be paid this amount. 
However, if the payout is larger ($300 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine whether or not 
you are actually paid this amount. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the amount, and on the date that 
you chose to receive it. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn nothing in this task. This roll will be 
at the end of the experiment, and in private, when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you preferred the 
sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown above.  You would then 
roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the row. Suppose the outcome was 5 
and the fifth row is selected, where you preferred a payment of $369.04 in twenty-eight days. Since this 
payment is $300 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the end of the experiment. If the 
outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $369.04 in twenty-eight days. However, if the outcome is 3, or 
anything other than 1, you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. If you 
receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation from Professor 
Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
 
The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is paid out 
at the end of the experiment as cash.  
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D. Instructions: Treatment FED35 
B_T3 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  The sooner date will be some weeks from 
today, while the later date will be even more weeks from today. An example of a decision screen is shown 




This screen shows seven decisions.  Each decision is presented on a different row.  All decisions 
have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment that today is January 
1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s look at the first decision in the 
example above (the one on the first decision row).  The sooner choice pays $100 in thirty-five days from 
today, where “today” is January 1, 2012 in the example, and the later choice pays $109.59 in sixty-three days 
from today.  You choose between these two options by clicking the button under the option you prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen having seven choices for 
you to make.  You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving to the next decision 
screen.  While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decisions is that the dollar amounts 
of the future payment will change.  However, different decision screens will have different dollar amounts 
and future payment dates. So, you should make sure to pay attention to both the changing dollar amounts 
and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision screens 
by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, 
to pick one decision row on that screen. When you make your choices you will not know which decision 




Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choice you made and the 
payout for that choice. If the payout is smaller (less than $100), you will actually be paid this amount. 
However, if the payout is larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine whether or not 
you are actually paid this amount. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the amount, and on the date that 
you chose to receive it. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn nothing in this task. This roll will be 
at the end of the experiment, and in private, when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you preferred the 
sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown above.  You would then 
roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the row. Suppose the outcome was 5 
and the fifth row is selected, where you preferred a payment of $123.01 in sixty-three days. Since this 
payment is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the end of the experiment. If the 
outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in sixty-three days. However, if the outcome is 3, or 
anything other than 1, you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. If you 
receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation from Professor 
Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
 
The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is paid out 
at the end of the experiment as cash.  
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E. Instructions: Treatment Free2 
B_T4 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  You will be presented with a series of 
decision pairs arranged in seven rows per decision screen. Each decision consists of a smaller amount that 
will be paid sooner and a larger amount that will be paid at a later date. The two pairs in a row involve the 
same amounts but different dates. An example of a decision screen is shown below. The dates and amounts 




This screen shows seven pairs of independent decisions.  Each decision pair is presented on a 
different row.  All decision pairs have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for 
the moment that today is January 1, 2012.  In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s 
look at the first decision pair in the example above (the one on the first decision row).  In the first decision, 
the sooner choice pays $100 today, January 1, 2012 in the example, and the later choice pays $109.59 in 
twenty-eight days from today.  The second decision in this row offers the choice between $100 in thirty-five 
days or $109.59 in sixty-three days from today.  
 
If you choose the sooner option for one decision in a pair, you are free to choose the sooner or later 
option for the other decision in that pair. And if you choose the later option for one decision in a pair, you 
are free to choose the sooner or later option for the other decision in that pair. In other words, it is possible 
to choose the sooner option in one decision and the later option in the other decision of the same pair, to 
choose the later option in one decision and the sooner option the other decision of the same pair, or to 
choose the same option in each decision of the same pair. You choose by clicking the button under the 
alternative you prefer. 
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The above screen example shows a situation in which someone chose the same options in each pair. 








We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen displaying seven decision 
pairs and fourteen choices for you to make.  You must make all fourteen choices on each decision screen 
before moving to the next decision screen.  While on a single decision screen, the only difference between 
decision pairs is that the dollar amounts of the future payment will change. However, pairs on different 
decision screens will have different dollar amounts and future payment dates.  So, you should make sure to 
pay attention to both the changing dollar amounts and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision screens 
by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, 
to pick one decision row on that screen. This means you will be paid for both choices that you made in that 
pair. When you make your choices you will not know which decision pair will be selected for payment. You 
should therefore treat each decision as if it might actually count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choices you made and the 
payouts for those choices. If the individual payouts in the selected decision row are smaller (less than $100), 
you will actually be paid both amounts. However, if the individual payouts in the selected decision row are 
larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine whether or not you are actually paid these 
amounts. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the amounts, and on the dates that you chose to receive 
them. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end of the 
experiment, and in private, when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the first screen example was selected and you preferred 
the sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown above.  You would 
then roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the row. Suppose the outcome 
was 5 and the fifth row is selected. In this row you preferred a payment of $123.01 in twenty-eight days in 
the first decision and $123.01 in sixty-three days in the second decision. Since this payment is $100 or 
greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the end of the experiment. If the outcome of your die-roll 
is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in twenty-eight days and another $123.01 in sixty-three days. However, if the 
outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. If you 
receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation from Professor 
Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
 
The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is paid out 
at the end of the experiment as cash. 
  
 A14
F. Instructions: Treatment Forced2 
B_T5 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  You will be presented with a series of 
decision pairs arranged in seven rows per decision screen. Each decision consists of a smaller amount that 
will be paid sooner and a larger amount that will be paid at a later date. The two pairs in a row involve the 
same amounts but different dates. An example of a decision screen is shown below. The dates and amounts 




This screen shows seven pairs of tied-together decisions. Each decision pair is presented on a 
different row.  All decision pairs have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for 
the moment that today is January 1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s 
look at the first decision pair in the example above (the one on the first decision row).  The first sooner 
choice pays $100 today, January 1, 2012 in the example, and the first later choice pays $109.59 in twenty-
eight days from today.  The second sooner choice pays $100 in thirty-five days from today and the second 
later choice pays $109.59 in sixty-three days from today.  
 
If you choose the sooner option for one decision in a pair, you are also choosing the sooner option 
for the other decision in that pair. In other words, it is not possible to choose the sooner option in one 
decision and the later option in the other decision of the same pair. If you select the sooner options in one 
pair, you are free to select the later options in any other pair. You choose by clicking the button under the 
alternative you prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen displaying seven choices for 
you to make. You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving to the next decision 
screen. While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decision pairs is that the dollar 
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amounts of the future payment will change.  However, pairs on different decision screens will have different 
dollar amounts and future payment dates.  So, you should make sure to pay attention to both the changing 
dollar amounts and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision screens 
by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, 
to pick one decision row on that screen. This means you will be paid for both of the choices in that pair, which 
you made at the same time.  When you make your choices you will not know which decision pair will be 
selected for payment. You should therefore treat each decision as if it might actually count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choice you made and the 
resulting payouts. If the individual payouts in the selected decision row are smaller (less than $100), you will 
actually be paid both amounts. However, if the individual payouts in the selected decision row are larger 
($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine whether or not you are actually paid these 
amounts. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the amounts, and on the dates that you chose to receive 
them. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end of the 
experiment, and in private, when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you preferred the 
sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown above.  You would then 
roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the row. Suppose the outcome was 5 
and the fifth row is selected. In this row you preferred a payment of $123.01 in twenty-eight days in the first 
decision and, consequently, $123.01 in sixty-three days in the second decision.  Since this payment is $100 or 
greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the end of the experiment. If the outcome of your die-roll 
is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in twenty-eight days and another $123.01 in sixty-three days. However, if the 
outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. If you 
receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation from Professor 
Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
 
The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is paid out 
at the end of the experiment as cash.  
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G. Instructions: Treatment Free3 
B_T6 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a “sooner” date 
or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  You will be presented with a series of decision triples 
arranged in seven rows per decision screen. Each decision consists of a smaller amount that will be paid 
sooner and a larger amount that will be paid at a later date. The three triples in a row involve the same 
amounts but different dates. An example of a decision screen is shown below. The dates and amounts in 




This screen shows seven triples of independent decisions.  Each decision triple is presented on a 
different row.  All decision triples have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for 
the moment that today is January 1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s 
look at the first decision triple in the example above (the one on the first decision row).  In the first 
decision, the sooner choice pays $100 today, January 1, 2012 in the example, and the later choice pays 
$109.59 in twenty-eight days from today.  The second decision in this row offers the choice between $100 in 
thirty-five days or $109.59 in sixty-three days from today. The third decision in this row offers the choice 
between $100 in seventy days or $109.59 in ninety-eight days from today.  
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen displaying seven decision 
triples and twenty-one choices for you to make. You must make all twenty-one choices on each decision 
screen before moving to the next decision screen.  While on a single decision screen, the only difference 
between decision triples is that the dollar amounts of the future payment will change. However, triples on 
different decision screens will have different dollar amounts and future payment dates.  So, you should make 
sure to pay attention to both the changing dollar amounts and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
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If you choose the sooner option for one decision in a triple, you are free to choose the sooner or 
later option for the other two decisions in that triple. And if you choose the later option for one decision in 
a triple, you are free to choose the sooner or later option for the other two decisions in that triple. In other 
words, it is possible to choose the sooner option in one decision and the later option in any of the other two 
decisions of the same triple, to choose the later option in one decision and the sooner option in any of the 
other two decisions of the same triple, or to choose the same option in each decision of the same triple. You 
choose by clicking the button under the alternative you prefer. 
 
The above screen example shows a situation in which someone chose the same options in each 









After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision screens 
by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, 
to pick one decision row on that screen. This means you will be paid for all three choices that you made in 
that triple. When you make your choices you will not know which decision triple will be selected for 
payment. You should therefore treat each decision as if it might actually count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choices you made and the 
payouts for those choices. If the individual payouts in the selected decision row are smaller (less than $100), 
you will actually be paid all three amounts. However, if the individual payouts in the selected decision row 
are larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine whether or not you are actually paid 
these amounts. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the amounts, and on the dates that you chose to 
receive them. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end 
of the experiment, and in private, when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the first screen example was selected and you preferred 
the sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown above.  You would 
then roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the row. Suppose the outcome 
was 5 and the fifth row is selected. In this row you preferred a payment of $123.01 in twenty-eight days in 
the first decision, $123.01 in sixty-three days in the second decision, and $123.01 in ninety-eight days in the 
third decision. Since this payment is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the end of the 
experiment. If the outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in twenty-eight days, $123.01 in 
sixty-three days, and another $123.01. However, if the outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, you will get 
nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. If you 
receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation from Professor 
Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
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 The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is paid out 
at the end of the experiment as cash. 
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H. Instructions: Treatment Forced3 
B_T7 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  You will be presented with a series of 
decision triples arranged in seven rows per decision screen. Each decision consists of a smaller amount that 
will be paid sooner and a larger amount that will be paid at a later date. The three triples in a row involve the 
same amounts but different dates. An example of a decision screen is shown below. The dates and amounts 




This screen shows seven triples of tied-together decisions.  Each decision triple is presented on a 
different row.  All decision triples have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for 
the moment that today is January 1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s 
look at the first decision triple in the example above (the one on the first decision row).  In the first 
decision, the sooner choice pays $100 today, January 1, 2012 in the example, and the later choice pays 
$109.59 in twenty-eight days from today.  The second decision in this row offers the choice between $100 in 
thirty-five days or $109.59 in sixty-three days from today. The third decision in this row offers the choice 
between $100 in seventy days or $109.59 in ninety-eight days from today.  
 
If you choose the sooner option for one decision in a triple, you are also choosing the sooner option 
for the other two decisions in that triple. In other words, it is not possible to choose the sooner option in 
one decision and the later option in the other decisions of the same triple. If you select the sooner options 
in one triple, you are free to select the later options in any other triple. You choose by clicking the button 
under the alternative you prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen displaying seven choices for 
you to make. You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving to the next decision 
screen. While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decision triples is that the dollar 
amounts of the future payment will change.  However, triples on different decision screens will have 
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different dollar amounts and future payment dates.  So, you should make sure to pay attention to both the 
changing dollar amounts and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision screens 
by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, 
to pick one decision row on that screen. This means you will be paid for all three choices in that triple, which 
you made at the same time.  When you make your choices you will not know which decision triple will be 
selected for payment. You should therefore treat each decision as if it might actually count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choices you made and the 
resulting payouts. If the individual payouts in the selected decision row are smaller (less than $100), you will 
actually be paid all three amounts. However, if the individual payouts in the selected decision row are larger 
($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine whether or not you are actually paid these 
amounts. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the amounts, and on the dates that you chose to receive 
them. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end of the 
experiment, and in private, when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you preferred the 
sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown above.  You would then 
roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the row. Suppose the outcome was 5 
and the fifth row is selected. In this row you preferred a payment of $123.01 in twenty-eight days in the first 
decision and, consequently, $123.01 in sixty-three days in the second decision, and $123.01 in ninety-eight 
days in the third decision. Since this payment is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the 
end of the experiment. If the outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in twenty-eight days, 
$123.01 in sixty-three days, and another $123.01. However, if the outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, 
you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. If you 
receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation from Professor 
Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
 
The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is paid out at the 
end of the experiment as cash.
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Appendix B: Structural Econometric Specification 
 
Estimates of discounting parameters depend crucially on the curvature of the utility function, as 
stressed by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008]. It follows from Jensen’s Inequality that 
estimating a more concave curvature of the instantaneous utility function results in lower inferred discount 
rates for the same observed choice data. This theoretical insight has important design and econometric 
implications. With respect to experimental design, it suggests the use of separate tasks for the elicitation of 
risk attitudes and time preferences. We decided, instead, to use choice data that had been previously 
collected from samples drawn from the same population of GSU undergraduate students. Since the subjects 
are drawn from the same population one may assume that they are comparable and condition the 
discounting parameter estimates from one sample on the risk coefficient estimates from the other sample.1 
Econometrically, the interrelation of risk and time preferences implies their joint estimation via full-
information maximum likelihood. 
Assume that the utility of income from an experimental lottery choice task is defined by the 
following constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification: 
ܷ(ݔ) = ݔ(ଵି௥) (1 − ݎ)⁄ ,        (B1) 
where ݔ is the lottery prize and ݎ represents a coefficient that indicates the level of constant relative risk 
aversion. With this specification ݎ = 0 describes risk-neutrality, ݎ < 0 corresponds to risk-loving 
preferences, and ݎ > 0 corresponds to risk-averse preferences.  
When an estimate of  ݎ is considered in the ML iteration process, one can calculate the expected 
utility of a typical lottery ݅. If lottery ݅ has ݆ possible outcomes, its EU is given by                                                  
ܧ ௜ܷ = ∑ ݌൫ݔ௝൯ ܷ(ݔ௝)௝         (B2) 
Then, for each decision pair an index is calculated that indicates the difference in the expected utility of both 
lotteries in a decision pair. Formally, 
                                                 
1 When the likelihood of the discounting parameter is evaluated, conditional on risk parameters, nothing informs the statistical 
package that the choices over risky lotteries and the choices over SS/LL pairs were made by the same person. One can establish a 
connection in standard errors, by clustering by the subjects’ ID numbers. However, the clustering over risky choices does not 
have to match the clustering over time-dated options. So these choices do not have to come from the same sample, although they 
should ideally come from the same population: see Coller, Harrison, and Rutström [2012; p.383-384].  
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∆ܧܷ = ܧ ௅ܷ − ܧܷோ,         (B3) 
where ܧ ௅ܷ is the “left” lottery and ܧܷோ is the “right” lottery in a decision pair as presented to subjects. The 
function that links the latent index in (B3) to observed choice behavior is the cumulative density function 
(cdf) of the univariate normal distribution Φ(⋅), resulting in a probit model. The probability of choosing the 
“right” lottery can be written 
݌ݎ݋ܾ(ܿℎ݋݋ݏ݁ ܴ) = Φ(∆ܧܷ).       (B4) 
Thus the latent index in (B3) is linked to the observed choices by making the statement that lottery is 
chosen, when the ∆ܧܷ > 0.5.  
This basic approach can be extended in several ways. An important addition is accounting for 
behavioral errors. The structural probit model cannot predict individual decision making with certainty. 
Decision makers may deviate from their true underlying preferences for a variety of reasons. Behavioral 
error specifications can account for various error sources, ranging from random deviations due to attention 
lapses to systematic violations related to the psychology of perception and judgment. A particularly 
influential behavioral error specification is due to Fechner [1860]. Its application to the evaluation of risky 
prospects was later popularized by Hey and Orme [1994]. The inclusion of the Fechner error specification 
expands the latent index in (B3) to 
∆ܧܷ = (ܧ ௅ܷ − ܧܷோ)/ߤ        (B5) 
where the new parameter ߤ allows the otherwise deterministic EUT model to account for deviations from 
the underlying preference structure.  
Wilcox [2008][2011] suggests an additional characterization of behavioral errors, called “contextual 
utilty.” The intuition behind contextual utility originates from psychological experiments on signal detection 
and stimulus discrimination. These studies discovered that errors became more likely as the range of 
possible stimuli increase. Contextual utility respects this observation, by assuming that evaluative errors 
increase with the perceived range of outcomes. Econometrically, this implies that the standard deviation of 
the behavioral error is proportional to the range of utilities of the outcomes in a lottery pair. The contextual 
error specification is given by 
R
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∆ܧܷ = (ܧ ௅ܷ − ܧܷோ ߥ)⁄ /ߤ        (B6) 
where the new parameter ߥ is defined as the maximum utility over all outcomes minus the minimum utility 
over all outcomes in the lottery pair, i.e., over the context of that pair. This specification has a normalizing 
effect on the latent index, which remains in the unit interval. The contextual error specification is 
particularly parsimonious, since the parameter ߥ is defined by data, so that no additional parameter 
estimation is required. The specification also allows for inferences regarding “stochastically more risk 
averse” relationships. The latter refers to a stochastic notion of the familiar Arrow-Pratt metric of risk 
aversion. A stochastically risk averse subject is “on average” risk averse, but the metric is flexible enough to 
deal with choices that deviate from the subject’s general risk aversion. With the latent index remaining 
within the bounds of the unit interval, one can compare the stochastic risk aversion of subjects who choose 
in dramatically different decision contexts (i.e. who face lotteries with very different prizes). 
Once the parameters of interest are defined, structural estimation can be undertaken. The log-
likelihood function is  
ܮܮா௎்(ݎ, ߤ; ݕ, ܺ) = ∑ ൥
൫݈݊Φ(∆EU) × I(ݕ௜ = 1)൯ +
ቀln൫1 − Φ(∆ܧܷ)൯ × ܫ(ݕ௜ = −1)ቁ
൩ ,௜    (B7) 
where the indicator function ܫ(∙) signifies whether the right (ݕ௜ = 1) or the left (ݕ௜ = −1) lottery is 
chosen. The parameters ݎ and ߤ indicate the CRRA coefficient and the Fechner error term, respectively. 
The parameters can in principle be conditioned on a vector ܺ of demographic characteristics. It is useful to 
constrain the parameter ߤ to be greater than zero. 
People may not necessarily behave as if given probabilities affect their lottery evaluations with 
objective values. Instead, they may distort these probabilities in their perception – a process that can be 
described by attaching subjective weights to probabilities. However, early treatments of subjective decision 
weights by Edwards [1962] and Kahneman and Tversky [1979] resulted in (allegedly) implausible violations 
of first-order stochastic dominance. These difficulties are avoided by Rank Dependent Utility theory (RDU), 
due to Quiggin [1982], which derives probability weights from the entire distribution over ranked outcomes, 
not from individual probabilities. The resulting decision weights reflect the subjective distortion of objective 
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probabilities. The RDU model, which nests the EUT model, is considered as an alternative data generating 
process (DGP) for the risk preference data.2 This requires the introduction of a probability weighting 
function. A variety of weighting functions have been proposed in the literature, primarily by Quiggin [1982], 
Tversky and Kahneman [1992] and Prelec [1998].   
Prelec [1998] contributes a flexible two parameter specification of probability weighting:  
߱(݌) = exp[−ߟ(− ln ݌)థ],        (B8) 
with ߟ > 0 and ߶ > 0. This weighting function is derived from several axioms that reflect apparent 
regularities of probability weighting. The specification requires the estimation of two parameters ߟ and ߶. 
The log-likelihood function is then 
ܮܮோ஽௎(ݎ, ߟ, ߶, ߤ; ݕ, ܺ) = ∑ ൥
൫݈݊Φ(∆RDU) × I(ݕ௜ = 1)൯ +
ቀln൫1 − Φ(∆ܴܦܷ)൯ × ܫ(ݕ௜ = −1)ቁ
൩ .௜   (B9)  
There is no probability weighting when ߟ = ߶ = 1.  
The estimation of discounting behavior requires joint estimation of risk and time preferences. 
Suppose the SS amount is available at time ݐ, whereas the LL amount is delivered at time ݐ + ߬. If 
exponential discounting holds, the present value of option SS is given by 
ܲ ௌܸௌா = (1 (1 + ߜ)௧) (జାௌௌ)
(భషೝ)
ଵି௥ + (1 (1 + ߜ)௧ାఛ)
జ(భషೝ)
ଵି௥ ,ൗൗ     (B10) 
where ߜ is the discount rate and ߭ denotes some measure of background consumption. Expression (B10) 
says that the present value of option SS is the discounted utility of receiving the amount SS, integrated with 
the background consumption ߭, at time ݐ and the discounted utility of receiving nothing beyond the utility 
of background consumption at time ݐ + ߬. Utility is described using the CRRA specification from (B4). 
Similarly, conditional on exponential discounting being the true latent process, the present value of option 
LL is given by 






(ଵି௥)      (B11) 
                                                 
2 There is, of course, a wealth of other models of choice under risk that could have been considered. A popular alternative that 
does not nest EUT of RDU is Prospect Theory, but several other models have been proposed by behavioral economists: see 
Starmer [2000] for a review. Cognitive psychologists have contributed various process models; Johnson and Busemeyer [2010] 
provides an overview of the literature from a psychological perspective.  
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A latent index, formally equivalent to the index considered in the risk aversion model, is defined as: 
∆ܸܲா = ௉௏ಽಽಶ ି௉௏ೄೄಶఔ ,         (B12)              
where the parameter ߥ denotes the behavioral error specification. 
The estimation maximizes the following conditional log-likelihood function: 
ܮܮா(ݎ, ߟ, ߶, ߜ, ߤ, ߥ; ݕ, ߭, ܺ) = ∑ ቈ ൫݈݊Φ(∆ܸܲ
ா) × ܫ(ݕ௜ = 1)൯ +
(ln (1 − Φ(∆ܸܲா)) × ܫ(ݕ௜ = −1))
቉௜  ,  (B13) 
where ݕ௜ = 1 and ݕ௜ = −1 denote the choice of LL and SS, respectively. The vector ܺ includes observable 
demographic characteristics. The joint log-likelihood function, denoted ܮܮோ஽௎_ா , can then be written as  
ܮܮோ஽௎_ா(ݎ, ߟ, ߶, ߜ, ߤ, ߥ; ݕ, ߭, ܺ) = ܮܮோ஽௎ + ܮܮா      (B14) 
where ܮܮோ஽௎ is the aggregate log-likelihood for risk preference choices, assuming RDU with a Prelec 
probability weighting function, and ܮܮா  is the aggregate log-likelihood for time preference choices, 
assuming exponential discounting. 
Structural estimation is performed in a similar fashion when alternative discounting models are 
studied. Consider, for example, hyperbolic discounting as specified in (4). The present value of SS is then  






ଵି௥ .     (B15)  
Similarly, the present value of LL is given by 






(ଵି௥) .     (B16) 
The latent index is then  
∆ܸܲுଶ = ௉௏ಽಽಹమି௉௏ೄೄಹమఎ .         (B17) 
The log-likelihood function of the hyperbolic discounting model is given by 
ܮܮுଶ(ݎ, ߟ, ߶, ܭ, ߤ, ߥ; ݕ, ߭, ܺ) = ∑ ൥
൫݈݊Φ(∆ܸܲுଶ) × ܫ(ݕ௜ = 1)൯ +
ቀln൫1 − Φ(∆ܸܲுଶ)൯ × ܫ(ݕ௜ = −1)ቁ
൩ ௜ .  (B18) 
The joint log-likelihood function is 
ܮܮோ஽௎_ுଶ(ݎ, ߟ, ߶, ܭ, ߤ, ߥ; ݕ, ߭, ܺ) = ܮܮோ஽௎ + ܮܮுଶ.     (B19) 
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One can expect that impulsive and controlled processes are both present in the population. 
Psychologists have contributed a rich literature on dual process models. The notion of dual cognitive 
processes has been applied to several areas in reasoning, social cognition, as well as judgment and decision 
making. The various models have in common that they assume that manifest behavior is determined by two 
modes of processing: an automatic process that is often associated with fast, unconscious, heuristic-driven, 
and impulsive cognition and a controlled process that is often associated with slow, conscious, deliberate, 
and sophisticated processing: see Barrett et al. [2004] and Evans [2008]. 
Different processes do not necessarily have to be reduced to a one-dimensional utility index, as most 
economic models suggest. An alternative strategy is exemplified by the SP/A model of Lopes [1987]: a 
psychological dual criterion approach to decision making under risk. This model proposes two criteria that 
people consult when evaluating lotteries. The security-potential criterion implies a probability weighting 
model, much like RDU. The aspiration criterion, on the other hand, introduces a reference point, stressed 
by Lopes and Oden [1995]. Both latent criteria are presumed to be employed independently but 
simultaneously. 
Traditional economic models usually integrate those latent processes into a one-dimensional 
criterion. This is why they do not necessarily help us to understand how observed choices can result from 
the interplay of impulsive and controlled processes. By contrast, dual criteria models provide such a 
guideline. They allow for the possibility of multiple criteria for multiple decision processes, as noted by 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2014a]. The relative contribution of each process to the observable 
outcome can be naturally estimated by a finite mixture model using maximum likelihood. This approach 
estimates the grand likelihood of the dual criteria model as the probability weighted average of the 
conditional likelihood estimates of each criterion being correct: for examples, see Harrison and Rutström 
[2009], Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2014a] and Coller, Harrison and Rutström [2012]. 
Fortunately, accounting for multiple processes requires only a straightforward extension of the 
structural models considered so far. Suppose there are only two DGPs. Each individual process can be 
estimated as outlined above, where the likelihood of each outcome is the probability of its occurrence 
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conditional on the assumed DGP being true. To assess the contribution of each process, a comprehensive 
overarching model is then constructed. With two individual models included, this involves the estimation of 
only one additional mixture parameter. 
Suppose the choice data are generated by exponential and hyperbolic discounting behavior. Again, 
the specifications ܦா and ܦுଶ are used. The discounting parameters ߜ and ܭ are jointly estimated with the 
risk parameter ݎ from the CRRA specification in (B1). Using contextual utility, the behavioral error 
parameter ߤ is added. Similarly behavioral errors in each discounting model are captured by the parameter 
ߥ.3 All those steps are identical to the ones that would be followed if each discounting model was estimated 
separately. However, a mixture model requires the additional step of writing a grand log-likelihood function, 
which is simply the sum of the probability weighted conditional likelihoods: 
ܮܮோ஽௎_ாିுଶ(ݎ, ߟ, ߶, ߜ, ܭ, ߤ, ߥ; ݕ, ߱, ܺ) = ∑
ln [൫ߨோ஽௎_ா × ܮ௜ோ஽௎_ா൯ +
ቀ(1 − ߨோ஽௎_ா) × ܮ௜ோ஽௎_ுଶቁ]௜
  (B20) 
The grand log-likelihood function ܮܮோ஽௎_ாିுଶ  assumes that the latent discounting process is characterized 
in part by exponential and in part by hyperbolic discounting, and that risk preferences are consistent with 
RDU with a Prelec probability weighting function. It includes the new parameter ߨா which is the probability 
of exponential discounting (with RDU consistent risk preferences) being the true model. Since only two 
latent processes are considered, the probability of hyperbolic discounting (with RDU consistent risk 
preferences) is necessarily (1-ߨா). 
Harrison and Rutström [2009; p.143-144] propose an interpretation of mixture models, according to 
which the mixture probability of a specific process is interpreted as the chance that the choice of a subject is 
consistent with this process. This interpretation has direct implications for the present experimental results: 
if reward bundling is effective, one can expect the mixture probability of controlled choice behavior, as 
described by exponential discounting, to be higher in bundling treatments. 
                                                 
3 It is possible, and common, to use only one behavioral error term for all assumed discounting process in a mixture model. 
However, all mixture models reported here allowed for a separate behavioral error term for each discounting process. One reason 
for this approach is the expectation that separate error terms might facilitate the ML estimation by enhancing numerical stability. 
Moreover, there are also theoretical reasons for this approach: mixture models propose two or more data generating processes 
and it is perfectly possible that each of these processes is influenced by different behavioral errors. For the sake of simplicity, only 
one error term is mentioned during the introduction and theoretical discussion of mixture models.  
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Appendix C: Experimental Parameters for Risk Preference Task 
 
The column qid is the Question ID. Columns pL1 through pL4 refer to the probabilities for the 4 prizes of the left lottery; columns xL1 
through xL4 refer to the monetary prizes of the left lottery, columns pR1 through pR4 refer to the probabilities for the 4 prizes of the right 
lottery; and columns xR1 through xR4 refer to the monetary prizes of the right lottery. The logic behind the selection of this battery is explained 




|            qid   pL1   pL2   pL3   pL4   xL1   xL2   xL3   xL4   pR1   pR2   pR3   pR4   xR1    xR2   xR3   xR4 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|        allais1     0     1     0     0     0     5     0     0   .01   .89    .1     0     0      5    25     0 | 
|        allais2   .89   .11     0     0     0     5     0     0    .9     0    .1     0     0      5    25     0 | 
|        allais3     0     1     0     0     0    15     0     0   .01   .89    .1     0     0     15    75     0 | 
|        allais4   .89   .11     0     0     0    15     0     0    .9     0    .1     0     0     15    75     0 | 
|       camerer1     0     0    .2    .8     0     5    35    70     0    .1     0    .9     0      5    35    70 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|      camerer10     0    .4    .6     0     0     5    35    70     0    .6    .2    .2     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer11     0    .5    .4    .1     0     5    35    70     0    .7     0    .3     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer12     0    .8    .2     0     0     5    35    70     0    .9     0    .1     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer13     0    .2    .2    .6     0     5    35    70     0    .3     0    .7     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer14     0    .6    .2    .2     0     5    35    70     0    .7     0    .3     0      5    35    70 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|      camerer15     0   .65   .25    .1     0     5    35    70     0   .75   .05    .2     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer16     0   .55    .3   .15     0     5    35    70     0   .65    .1   .25     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer17     0   .35    .4   .25     0     5    35    70     0   .45    .2   .35     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer18     0   .05   .55    .4     0     5    35    70     0   .15   .35    .5     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer19     0   .05    .5   .45     0     5    35    70     0   .15    .3   .55     0      5    35    70 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|       camerer2     0     0    .6    .4     0     5    35    70     0    .1    .4    .5     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer20     0   .15    .3   .55     0     5    35    70     0   .25    .1   .65     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer21     0   .05    .9   .05     0     5    35    70     0   .15    .7   .15     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer22     0   .35    .3   .35     0     5    35    70     0   .45    .1   .45     0      5    35    70 | 
|      camerer23     0   .45    .5   .05     0     5    35    70     0   .55    .3   .15     0      5    35    70 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|       camerer3     0     0    .6    .4     0     5    35    70     0    .2    .2    .6     0      5    35    70 | 
|       camerer4     0    .1    .4    .5     0     5    35    70     0    .3     0    .7     0      5    35    70 | 
|       camerer5     0     0     1     0     0     5    35    70     0    .1    .8    .1     0      5    35    70 | 
|       camerer6     0     0     1     0     0     5    35    70     0    .2    .6    .2     0      5    35    70 | 
|       camerer7     0    .3    .4    .3     0     5    35    70     0    .5     0    .5     0      5    35    70 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|       camerer8     0    .4    .2    .4     0     5    35    70     0    .5     0    .5     0      5    35    70 | 
|       camerer9     0    .4    .6     0     0     5    35    70     0    .5    .4    .1     0      5    35    70 | 
|    holt_laury1     0    .1    .9     0     0    20    16     0     0    .1    .9     0     0   38.5     1     0 | 
|    holt_laury2     0    .2    .8     0     0    20    16     0     0    .2    .8     0     0   38.5     1     0 | 
|    holt_laury3     0    .3    .7     0     0    20    16     0     0    .3    .7     0     0   38.5     1     0 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|    holt_laury4     0    .4    .6     0     0    20    16     0     0    .4    .6     0     0   38.5     1     0 | 
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|    holt_laury5     0    .5    .5     0     0    20    16     0     0    .5    .5     0     0   38.5     1     0 | 
|    holt_laury6     0    .6    .4     0     0    20    16     0     0    .6    .4     0     0   38.5     1     0 | 
|    holt_laury7     0    .7    .3     0     0    20    16     0     0    .7    .3     0     0   38.5     1     0 | 
|    holt_laury8     0    .8    .2     0     0    20    16     0     0    .8    .2     0     0   38.5     1     0 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|    holt_laury9     0    .9    .1     0     0    20    16     0     0    .9    .1     0     0   38.5     1     0 | 
|          lssM1    .2    .2    .4    .2     0     0    60     0    .2    .2    .4    .2    60      0     0    60 | 
|          lssM1    .2    .2    .4    .2     0    60    25     0    .2    .2    .4    .2    25     25     0    65 | 
|          lssM2    .2    .2    .4    .2    25    25     0    60    .2    .2    .4    .2     0     65    25     0 | 
|          lssM2    .2    .2    .4    .2    60    25     0    60    .2    .2    .4    .2     0     65    25     0 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|          lssP1   .22    .2   .38    .2     0    60    36     0   .22    .2   .38    .2    36     36     0    60 | 
|          lssP2   .18    .2   .42    .2    36    36     0    60   .18    .2   .42    .2     0     60    60     0 | 
|          lssP2   .18    .2   .42    .2    36    36     0    60   .18    .2   .42    .2     0     60    36     0 | 
|  small_stakes1    .3    .1    .1    .5    18    34    34    38    .4    .1    .4    .1    13     46    46    49 | 
|  small_stakes1     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    30     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    18    45 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|  small_stakes1     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    30     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    12    49 | 
| small_stakes10    .4    .3    .1    .2    13    16    41    59    .3    .5    .1    .1     7     30    30    60 | 
| small_stakes10     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    20     0     0    .5    .5     0      0     2    39 | 
| small_stakes11    .1    .5    .1    .3     6    23    28    62    .2    .4    .3    .1    17     21    41    67 | 
| small_stakes11     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    80     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    62    99 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes12    .2    .3    .2    .3    11    14    46    66    .1    .3    .4    .2     8     22    35    68 | 
| small_stakes12     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    80     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    65    96 | 
| small_stakes13    .2    .4    .3    .1     1    19    44    60    .3    .3    .2    .2     5     17    32    64 | 
| small_stakes13     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    80     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    70    91 | 
| small_stakes14     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    85     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    77    94 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes14    .2    .4    .3    .1     2    50    52    64    .2    .3    .3    .2     7     34    59    68 | 
| small_stakes15    .4    .2    .3    .1     7    14    45    68    .4    .2    .3    .1     1     31    53    66 | 
| small_stakes15     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    75     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    62    90 | 
| small_stakes16     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    75     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    57    96 | 
| small_stakes16    .3    .3    .1    .3     0    14    30    64    .3    .3    .1    .3     5     13    43    67 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes17    .1    .1    .6    .2     2    14    20    66    .2    .2    .3    .3     2     16    28    68 | 
| small_stakes17     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    75     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    60    93 | 
| small_stakes18     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    70     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    60    82 | 
| small_stakes18    .3    .1    .5    .1     2    32    43    67    .4    .2    .2    .2     9     22    61    62 | 
| small_stakes19     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    85     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    77    95 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes19    .3    .2    .2    .3     9    12    50    62    .3    .3    .1    .3    10     15    16    67 | 
|  small_stakes2     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    30     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    15    46 | 
|  small_stakes2    .3    .3    .2    .2    21    27    35    42    .2    .3    .2    .3    13     26    41    53 | 
| small_stakes20    .1    .4    .4    .1     5    28    33    40    .2    .2    .2    .4    12     18    25    46 | 
| small_stakes20     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    70     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    58    85 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes21    .3    .2    .1    .4     8    24    31    43    .4    .2    .3    .1    21     29    31    55 | 
| small_stakes21     0     0     0     1     0     0     0   130     0     0    .5    .5     0      0   112   149 | 
| small_stakes22    .1    .3    .2    .4     8    22    31    44    .3    .5    .1    .1    25     26    28    57 | 
| small_stakes22     0     0     0     1     0     0     0   130     0     0    .5    .5     0      0   115   146 | 
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| small_stakes23     0     0     0     1     0     0     0   130     0     0    .5    .5     0      0   120   141 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes23    .1    .1    .3    .5     6    31    34    37    .1    .3    .2    .4     8     22    31    44 | 
| small_stakes24    .3    .4    .1    .2     8    27    39    50    .2    .3    .2    .3     3     19    29    47 | 
| small_stakes24     0     0     0     1     0     0     0   135     0     0    .5    .5     0      0   127   144 | 
| small_stakes25    .2    .4    .3    .1     5    26    34    49    .1    .2    .1    .6     1      2    21    38 | 
| small_stakes25     0     0     0     1     0     0     0   125     0     0    .5    .5     0      0   112   140 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes26    .2    .3    .2    .3     3    19    29    47    .3    .1    .5    .1    21     21    25    58 | 
| small_stakes26     0     0     0     1     0     0     0   125     0     0    .5    .5     0      0   107   146 | 
| small_stakes27    .3    .3    .1    .3     4    38    42    51    .1    .3    .5    .1     3     18    38    49 | 
| small_stakes27     0     0     0     1     0     0     0   125     0     0    .5    .5     0      0   110   143 | 
| small_stakes28     0     0     0     1     0     0     0   120     0     0    .5    .5     0      0   110   132 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes28    .4    .3    .1    .2     7    36    47    56    .4    .1    .1    .4     9     10    28    53 | 
| small_stakes29    .5    .2    .2    .1    11    35    52    57    .2    .4    .3    .1    16     24    31    63 | 
| small_stakes29     0     0     0     1     0     0     0   135     0     0    .5    .5     0      0   127   145 | 
|  small_stakes3    .2    .1    .4    .3    19    23    43    44    .3    .1    .3    .3    15     28    49    59 | 
|  small_stakes3     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    20     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    10    31 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes30    .3    .3    .1    .3    11    17    54    61    .3    .2    .3    .2    12     20    34    68 | 
| small_stakes30     0     0     0     1     0     0     0   120     0     0    .5    .5     0      0   108   135 | 
| small_stakes31    .3    .1    .2    .4    15    18    26    56    .3    .2    .2    .3    10     36    48    52 | 
| small_stakes32    .3    .1    .4    .2    17    23    42    58    .3    .2    .3    .2     8     35    44    52 | 
| small_stakes33    .1    .4    .1    .4    10    16    22    60    .4    .2    .2    .2    12     39    57    62 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes34    .4     0    .3    .3    25    37    39    57    .3    .3    .2    .2    24     31    50    58 | 
| small_stakes35    .3     0    .4    .3    21    29    41    55    .2    .1    .4    .3    20     24    48    53 | 
| small_stakes36     0    .4    .5    .1    18    26    42    66    .2    .2    .1    .5    16     23    51    56 | 
| small_stakes37    .1    .3    .3    .3    14    18    52    52     0    .1    .8    .1     2     16    39    57 | 
| small_stakes38    .1    .3    .6     0     8    30    51    69    .4    .2    .2    .2    23     32    60    68 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
| small_stakes39    .2     0    .4    .4    11    31    40    55    .3    .1    .3    .3    17     22    55    61 | 
|  small_stakes4    .1    .3    .2    .4    13    13    48    63    .3    .5    .1    .1    25     26    28    57 | 
|  small_stakes4     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    15     0     0    .5    .5     0      0     7    24 | 
| small_stakes40    .1    .4     0    .5    20    20    54    59    .3    .2    .1    .4    15     24    57    60 | 
|  small_stakes5    .1    .1    .6    .2     2    14    20    66    .1    .4    .2    .3    22     29    33    69 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|  small_stakes5     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    25     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    12    40 | 
|  small_stakes6    .2    .1    .3    .4     8    16    52    59    .2    .4    .3    .1    22     24    38    44 | 
|  small_stakes6     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    25     0     0    .5    .5     0      0     7    46 | 
|  small_stakes7    .1    .3    .1    .5     2    13    25    64    .1    .4    .2    .3    19     19    32    55 | 
|  small_stakes7     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    25     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    10    43 | 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|  small_stakes8    .1    .2    .3    .4    11    20    38    67    .2    .2    .4    .2    10     25    26    53 | 
|  small_stakes8     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    20     0     0    .5    .5     0      0    10    32 | 
|  small_stakes9    .3    .1    .3    .3    17    22    55    61    .1    .5    .1    .3    12     32    45    64 | 
|  small_stakes9     0     0     0     1     0     0     0    15     0     0    .5    .5     0      0     7    25 | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
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The battery consists of six categories of questions, flagged by the text in the variable qid which 
stands internally in the software for “question ID.” We explain what each group is testing, and cite one of 
the primary sources. The specific parameters in our case typically differ, to ensure prize levels 
commensurate with our inferential objective, but maintain the logical structure of the original lotteries. 
There were 175 subjects making between 52 and 100 binary choices, drawn from this complete battery. On 
average each subject made 74 choices. 
The first group are Allais Paradox questions, flagged as “allais.” Conlisk [1989] presents a real 
version of the Allais Paradox (AP), with these binary choices 
 ($5, 1.00) or ($0, 0.01; $5, 0.89; $25, 0.10)  (C1) 
and 
 ($0, 0.89; $5, 0.11) or ($0, 0.9; $25, 0.1)  (C2) 
He finds no evidence of the AP. There are other studies with comparable findings, and these are no well-
known lottery questions. 
 The second group, called “camerer,” are common-ratio tests of EUT from Camerer [1989][1992]. 
By way of background to these two sets of common-ratio tasks, so-called “border effects” arise when one 
nudges the lottery pairs in common ratio tests and common consequence tests into the interior of the MM 
triangle, or moves them significantly into the interior. The striking finding is that EUT often performs better 
when one does this. Actually, the evidence is mixed in interesting ways. 
 First, Camerer [1992] generated a remarkable series of experiments in which EUT did very well for 
interior lottery choices, but his data was unfortunately from hypothetical choices (justified in his footnote 7). 
These lotteries were well off the border, as illustrated in the top MM triangle on the next page. These can be 
contrasted with those in Camerer [1989] that were on the border, as illustrated in the bottom MM on the 
next page. But Harless [1992] found that just nudging the lotteries off the boundary did not improve 
behavior under EUT for real stakes, although it did dramatically for hypothetical and large stakes. 
 The lotteries used by Camerer [1989][1992] are shown below. We are free to select low, medium and 
high prizes, since nothing in his design depends on that. Some claims in Camerer [1992] that stakes matter 
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 The third group, called “holt_laury,” is an implementation of the 10 multiple price list questions 
popularized by Holt and Laury [2002], where each binary choice is presented to the subjects separately in 
our design and in random order. 
 The fourth battery, called “lssM,” are tests of monotonicity due to Loomes, Starmer and Sugden 
[1992]. Monotonicity, or first-order stochastic dominance, can be violated under Regret Theory. The 5 
questions below were developed by Loomes, Starmer and Sugden [1992] to test this hypothesis. As best one 
can tell, there is no difference between groups A and B apart from some differences in prizes. That is, one 
might just use the A prizes as well as the B prizes. In their evaluation of results they present both, and often 
pool them, and there is no discussion that they (A and B) lead to different theoretical predictions. 
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The fifth battery, called “lssP,” are tests of transitivity proposed by Loomes, Starmer and Sugden 
[1991], in experiments that were part of the experiments reported in Loomes, Starmer and Sugden [1992]. 
The tests of transitivity involve 15 choice questions, and were again split into two samples I and II 
(presumably the same as A and B in Loomes, Starmer and Sugden [1992] paper). We focus on the choices 
given to sample I. 
 
 The sixth battery, called “small_stakes,” used tests proposed by Cox and Sadiraj [2008; p. 33] to 
evaluate the calibration critiques of EUT offered by Hansson [1988] and Rabin [2000]. Give subjects a 
choice of a certain amount W for sure or some lottery (W-loss, 0.5; W+gain, 0.5) where the loss < W, gain 
> loss, and one varies the values of W for some feasible domain in terms of the experimental budget. To 
take some simple examples, consider 
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 $20 or ($10, 0.5; $31, 0.5)  (W1) 
 $30 or ($20, 0.5; $41, 0.5)  (W2) 
 ... 
 $90 or ($80, 0.5; $101, 0.5)  (W3) 
 $100 or ($90, 0.5; $111, 0.5)  (W4) 
which is just W = {$20, $30, ... $90, $100}, loss = $10 and gain = $11. Although one finds “small stakes” 
risk aversion for W1 and W2, there is evidence from Harrison, Lau, Swarthout and Ross [2017] that one 
finds “small stakes” risk neutrality for W3 and W4. For choices like W1 and W2 one finds subjects tending 
to select the sure option, but for choices like W3 and W4 they are split equally between the two or prefer the 
risky lottery. 
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Appendix D: Experimental Parameters for Time Preference Task 
 
 In each session, a subject saw 10 screens of discounting choices.  On each screen presented to a 
subject there were 7 rows of choices (with varying number of columns depending on treatment), for a total 
of 70 choice rows.  For each treatment, our discounting battery consisted of 5 sets of parameters (or MPLs, 
partitioned in the table below by horizontal rules), each with 17 rows, for a total of 85 choice rows.  Each of 
the 5 MPLs was split into two subsets, with the initial 10 rows in one subset and the final 7 rows in the 
other subset.  These 10 subsets defined the screens shown to each subject in random order.  However, for 
each subset with 10 rows, only 7 rows were randomly selected and shown on each screen (iid for each 
subject/screen). 
 
 Our reasoning for this sampling strategy was due to the following factors: 1) wanting coverage of all 
17 distinct growth rates; 2) practical space limitations from trying to have more than 7 rows per screen; and 
3) willingness to forego some of the choices with lower growth rates where the rates were more tightly 
concentrated. 
 
 Note: for the bundled treatments, there are multiple lines per qid in the table below.  The lines with 
a common qid define a single choice row, and the period value (of A, B, or C) indicates the sequence of 
bundled choices. 
 
 Note: Forced2 treatment values are not shown in the table below.  This is because the Forced2 
treatment values are identical to the Free2 treatment values (these treatments differed only in terms of the 
allowable responses).  Similarly, the Forced3 treatment values are not shown. 
 
treatment qid period FED (days) Sooner ($) Horizon (days) Later ($) Nominal rate (%) 
FED0 T0-01 A 0 10 28 10.04 5.2 
FED0 T0-02 A 0 10 28 10.08 10.4 
FED0 T0-03 A 0 10 28 10.12 15.6 
FED0 T0-04 A 0 10 28 10.15 19.6 
FED0 T0-05 A 0 10 28 10.19 24.8 
FED0 T0-06 A 0 10 28 10.23 30 
FED0 T0-07 A 0 10 28 10.31 40.4 
FED0 T0-08 A 0 10 28 10.38 49.5 
FED0 T0-09 A 0 10 28 10.58 75.6 
FED0 T0-10 A 0 10 28 10.77 100.4 
FED0 T0-11 A 0 10 28 10.96 125.1 
FED0 T0-12 A 0 10 28 11.15 149.9 
FED0 T0-13 A 0 10 28 11.34 174.7 
FED0 T0-14 A 0 10 28 11.53 199.4 
FED0 T0-15 A 0 10 28 12.3 299.8 
FED0 T0-16 A 0 10 28 13.07 400.2 
FED0 T0-17 A 0 10 28 13.84 500.6 
FED0 T0-18 A 0 30 28 30.12 5.2 
FED0 T0-19 A 0 30 28 30.23 10 
FED0 T0-20 A 0 30 28 30.35 15.2 
FED0 T0-21 A 0 30 28 30.46 20 
FED0 T0-22 A 0 30 28 30.58 25.2 
FED0 T0-23 A 0 30 28 30.69 30 
FED0 T0-24 A 0 30 28 30.92 40 
FED0 T0-25 A 0 30 28 31.15 50 
FED0 T0-26 A 0 30 28 31.73 75.2 
FED0 T0-27 A 0 30 28 32.3 99.9 
FED0 T0-28 A 0 30 28 32.88 125.1 
FED0 T0-29 A 0 30 28 33.45 149.9 
FED0 T0-30 A 0 30 28 34.03 175.1 
FED0 T0-31 A 0 30 28 34.6 199.9 
FED0 T0-32 A 0 30 28 36.9 299.8 
FED0 T0-33 A 0 30 28 39.21 400.2 
FED0 T0-34 A 0 30 28 41.51 500.1 
FED0 T0-35 A 0 60 28 60.23 5 
FED0 T0-36 A 0 60 28 60.46 10 
FED0 T0-37 A 0 60 28 60.69 15 
FED0 T0-38 A 0 60 28 60.92 20 
FED0 T0-39 A 0 60 28 61.15 25 
FED0 T0-40 A 0 60 28 61.38 30 
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treatment qid period FED (days) Sooner ($) Horizon (days) Later ($) Nominal rate (%) 
FED0 T0-41 A 0 60 28 61.84 40 
FED0 T0-42 A 0 60 28 62.3 50 
FED0 T0-43 A 0 60 28 63.45 75 
FED0 T0-44 A 0 60 28 64.6 99.9 
FED0 T0-45 A 0 60 28 65.75 124.9 
FED0 T0-46 A 0 60 28 66.9 149.9 
FED0 T0-47 A 0 60 28 68.05 174.9 
FED0 T0-48 A 0 60 28 69.21 200.1 
FED0 T0-49 A 0 60 28 73.81 300 
FED0 T0-50 A 0 60 28 78.41 400 
FED0 T0-51 A 0 60 28 83.01 499.9 
FED0 T0-52 A 0 100 28 100.38 5 
FED0 T0-53 A 0 100 28 100.77 10 
FED0 T0-54 A 0 100 28 101.15 15 
FED0 T0-55 A 0 100 28 101.53 19.9 
FED0 T0-56 A 0 100 28 101.92 25 
FED0 T0-57 A 0 100 28 102.3 30 
FED0 T0-58 A 0 100 28 103.07 40 
FED0 T0-59 A 0 100 28 103.84 50.1 
FED0 T0-60 A 0 100 28 105.75 75 
FED0 T0-61 A 0 100 28 107.67 100 
FED0 T0-62 A 0 100 28 109.59 125 
FED0 T0-63 A 0 100 28 111.51 150 
FED0 T0-64 A 0 100 28 113.42 174.9 
FED0 T0-65 A 0 100 28 115.34 200 
FED0 T0-66 A 0 100 28 123.01 300 
FED0 T0-67 A 0 100 28 130.68 399.9 
FED0 T0-68 A 0 100 28 138.36 500.1 
FED0 T0-69 A 0 300 28 301.15 5 
FED0 T0-70 A 0 300 28 302.3 10 
FED0 T0-71 A 0 300 28 303.45 15 
FED0 T0-72 A 0 300 28 304.6 20 
FED0 T0-73 A 0 300 28 305.75 25 
FED0 T0-74 A 0 300 28 306.9 30 
FED0 T0-75 A 0 300 28 309.21 40 
FED0 T0-76 A 0 300 28 311.51 50 
FED0 T0-77 A 0 300 28 317.26 75 
FED0 T0-78 A 0 300 28 323.01 100 
FED0 T0-79 A 0 300 28 328.77 125 
FED0 T0-80 A 0 300 28 334.52 150 
FED0 T0-81 A 0 300 28 340.27 175 
FED0 T0-82 A 0 300 28 346.03 200 
FED0 T0-83 A 0 300 28 369.04 300 
FED0 T0-84 A 0 300 28 392.05 400 
FED0 T0-85 A 0 300 28 415.07 500 
FED1 T1-01 A 1 10 29 10.04 5.2 
FED1 T1-02 A 1 10 29 10.08 10.4 
FED1 T1-03 A 1 10 29 10.12 15.6 
FED1 T1-04 A 1 10 29 10.15 19.6 
FED1 T1-05 A 1 10 29 10.19 24.8 
FED1 T1-06 A 1 10 29 10.23 30 
FED1 T1-07 A 1 10 29 10.31 40.4 
FED1 T1-08 A 1 10 29 10.38 49.5 
FED1 T1-09 A 1 10 29 10.58 75.6 
FED1 T1-10 A 1 10 29 10.77 100.4 
FED1 T1-11 A 1 10 29 10.96 125.1 
FED1 T1-12 A 1 10 29 11.15 149.9 
FED1 T1-13 A 1 10 29 11.34 174.7 
FED1 T1-14 A 1 10 29 11.53 199.4 
FED1 T1-15 A 1 10 29 12.3 299.8 
FED1 T1-16 A 1 10 29 13.07 400.2 
FED1 T1-17 A 1 10 29 13.84 500.6 
FED1 T1-18 A 1 30 29 30.12 5.2 
FED1 T1-19 A 1 30 29 30.23 10 
FED1 T1-20 A 1 30 29 30.35 15.2 
FED1 T1-21 A 1 30 29 30.46 20 
FED1 T1-22 A 1 30 29 30.58 25.2 
FED1 T1-23 A 1 30 29 30.69 30 
FED1 T1-24 A 1 30 29 30.92 40 
FED1 T1-25 A 1 30 29 31.15 50 
FED1 T1-26 A 1 30 29 31.73 75.2 
FED1 T1-27 A 1 30 29 32.3 99.9 
FED1 T1-28 A 1 30 29 32.88 125.1 
FED1 T1-29 A 1 30 29 33.45 149.9 
FED1 T1-30 A 1 30 29 34.03 175.1 
FED1 T1-31 A 1 30 29 34.6 199.9 
FED1 T1-32 A 1 30 29 36.9 299.8 
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treatment qid period FED (days) Sooner ($) Horizon (days) Later ($) Nominal rate (%) 
FED1 T1-33 A 1 30 29 39.21 400.2 
FED1 T1-34 A 1 30 29 41.51 500.1 
FED1 T1-35 A 1 60 29 60.23 5 
FED1 T1-36 A 1 60 29 60.46 10 
FED1 T1-37 A 1 60 29 60.69 15 
FED1 T1-38 A 1 60 29 60.92 20 
FED1 T1-39 A 1 60 29 61.15 25 
FED1 T1-40 A 1 60 29 61.38 30 
FED1 T1-41 A 1 60 29 61.84 40 
FED1 T1-42 A 1 60 29 62.3 50 
FED1 T1-43 A 1 60 29 63.45 75 
FED1 T1-44 A 1 60 29 64.6 99.9 
FED1 T1-45 A 1 60 29 65.75 124.9 
FED1 T1-46 A 1 60 29 66.9 149.9 
FED1 T1-47 A 1 60 29 68.05 174.9 
FED1 T1-48 A 1 60 29 69.21 200.1 
FED1 T1-49 A 1 60 29 73.81 300 
FED1 T1-50 A 1 60 29 78.41 400 
FED1 T1-51 A 1 60 29 83.01 499.9 
FED1 T1-52 A 1 100 29 100.38 5 
FED1 T1-53 A 1 100 29 100.77 10 
FED1 T1-54 A 1 100 29 101.15 15 
FED1 T1-55 A 1 100 29 101.53 19.9 
FED1 T1-56 A 1 100 29 101.92 25 
FED1 T1-57 A 1 100 29 102.3 30 
FED1 T1-58 A 1 100 29 103.07 40 
FED1 T1-59 A 1 100 29 103.84 50.1 
FED1 T1-60 A 1 100 29 105.75 75 
FED1 T1-61 A 1 100 29 107.67 100 
FED1 T1-62 A 1 100 29 109.59 125 
FED1 T1-63 A 1 100 29 111.51 150 
FED1 T1-64 A 1 100 29 113.42 174.9 
FED1 T1-65 A 1 100 29 115.34 200 
FED1 T1-66 A 1 100 29 123.01 300 
FED1 T1-67 A 1 100 29 130.68 399.9 
FED1 T1-68 A 1 100 29 138.36 500.1 
FED1 T1-69 A 1 300 29 301.15 5 
FED1 T1-70 A 1 300 29 302.3 10 
FED1 T1-71 A 1 300 29 303.45 15 
FED1 T1-72 A 1 300 29 304.6 20 
FED1 T1-73 A 1 300 29 305.75 25 
FED1 T1-74 A 1 300 29 306.9 30 
FED1 T1-75 A 1 300 29 309.21 40 
FED1 T1-76 A 1 300 29 311.51 50 
FED1 T1-77 A 1 300 29 317.26 75 
FED1 T1-78 A 1 300 29 323.01 100 
FED1 T1-79 A 1 300 29 328.77 125 
FED1 T1-80 A 1 300 29 334.52 150 
FED1 T1-81 A 1 300 29 340.27 175 
FED1 T1-82 A 1 300 29 346.03 200 
FED1 T1-83 A 1 300 29 369.04 300 
FED1 T1-84 A 1 300 29 392.05 400 
FED1 T1-85 A 1 300 29 415.07 500 
HiMag T2-01 A 0 30 28 30.12 5.2 
HiMag T2-02 A 0 30 28 30.23 10 
HiMag T2-03 A 0 30 28 30.35 15.2 
HiMag T2-04 A 0 30 28 30.46 20 
HiMag T2-05 A 0 30 28 30.58 25.2 
HiMag T2-06 A 0 30 28 30.69 30 
HiMag T2-07 A 0 30 28 30.92 40 
HiMag T2-08 A 0 30 28 31.15 50 
HiMag T2-09 A 0 30 28 31.73 75.2 
HiMag T2-10 A 0 30 28 32.3 99.9 
HiMag T2-11 A 0 30 28 32.88 125.1 
HiMag T2-12 A 0 30 28 33.45 149.9 
HiMag T2-13 A 0 30 28 34.03 175.1 
HiMag T2-14 A 0 30 28 34.6 199.9 
HiMag T2-15 A 0 30 28 36.9 299.8 
HiMag T2-16 A 0 30 28 39.21 400.2 
HiMag T2-17 A 0 30 28 41.51 500.1 
HiMag T2-18 A 0 90 28 90.35 5.1 
HiMag T2-19 A 0 90 28 90.69 10 
HiMag T2-20 A 0 90 28 91.04 15.1 
HiMag T2-21 A 0 90 28 91.38 20 
HiMag T2-22 A 0 90 28 91.73 25.1 
HiMag T2-23 A 0 90 28 92.07 30 
HiMag T2-24 A 0 90 28 92.76 40 
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HiMag T2-25 A 0 90 28 93.45 50 
HiMag T2-26 A 0 90 28 95.18 75 
HiMag T2-27 A 0 90 28 96.9 99.9 
HiMag T2-28 A 0 90 28 98.63 125 
HiMag T2-29 A 0 90 28 100.36 150.1 
HiMag T2-30 A 0 90 28 102.08 175 
HiMag T2-31 A 0 90 28 103.81 200 
HiMag T2-32 A 0 90 28 110.71 300 
HiMag T2-33 A 0 90 28 117.62 400.1 
HiMag T2-34 A 0 90 28 124.52 500 
HiMag T2-35 A 0 180 28 180.69 5 
HiMag T2-36 A 0 180 28 181.38 10 
HiMag T2-37 A 0 180 28 182.07 15 
HiMag T2-38 A 0 180 28 182.76 20 
HiMag T2-39 A 0 180 28 183.45 25 
HiMag T2-40 A 0 180 28 184.14 30 
HiMag T2-41 A 0 180 28 185.52 40 
HiMag T2-42 A 0 180 28 186.9 50 
HiMag T2-43 A 0 180 28 190.36 75 
HiMag T2-44 A 0 180 28 193.81 100 
HiMag T2-45 A 0 180 28 197.26 125 
HiMag T2-46 A 0 180 28 200.71 150 
HiMag T2-47 A 0 180 28 204.16 175 
HiMag T2-48 A 0 180 28 207.62 200 
HiMag T2-49 A 0 180 28 221.42 300 
HiMag T2-50 A 0 180 28 235.23 400 
HiMag T2-51 A 0 180 28 249.04 500 
HiMag T2-52 A 0 300 28 301.15 5 
HiMag T2-53 A 0 300 28 302.3 10 
HiMag T2-54 A 0 300 28 303.45 15 
HiMag T2-55 A 0 300 28 304.6 20 
HiMag T2-56 A 0 300 28 305.75 25 
HiMag T2-57 A 0 300 28 306.9 30 
HiMag T2-58 A 0 300 28 309.21 40 
HiMag T2-59 A 0 300 28 311.51 50 
HiMag T2-60 A 0 300 28 317.26 75 
HiMag T2-61 A 0 300 28 323.01 100 
HiMag T2-62 A 0 300 28 328.77 125 
HiMag T2-63 A 0 300 28 334.52 150 
HiMag T2-64 A 0 300 28 340.27 175 
HiMag T2-65 A 0 300 28 346.03 200 
HiMag T2-66 A 0 300 28 369.04 300 
HiMag T2-67 A 0 300 28 392.05 400 
HiMag T2-68 A 0 300 28 415.07 500 
HiMag T2-69 A 0 900 28 903.45 5 
HiMag T2-70 A 0 900 28 906.9 10 
HiMag T2-71 A 0 900 28 910.36 15 
HiMag T2-72 A 0 900 28 913.81 20 
HiMag T2-73 A 0 900 28 917.26 25 
HiMag T2-74 A 0 900 28 920.71 30 
HiMag T2-75 A 0 900 28 927.62 40 
HiMag T2-76 A 0 900 28 934.52 50 
HiMag T2-77 A 0 900 28 951.78 75 
HiMag T2-78 A 0 900 28 969.04 100 
HiMag T2-79 A 0 900 28 986.3 125 
HiMag T2-80 A 0 900 28 1003.56 150 
HiMag T2-81 A 0 900 28 1020.82 175 
HiMag T2-82 A 0 900 28 1038.08 200 
HiMag T2-83 A 0 900 28 1107.12 300 
HiMag T2-84 A 0 900 28 1176.16 400 
HiMag T2-85 A 0 900 28 1245.21 500 
FED35 T3-01 A 35 10 63 10.04 5.2 
FED35 T3-02 A 35 10 63 10.08 10.4 
FED35 T3-03 A 35 10 63 10.12 15.6 
FED35 T3-04 A 35 10 63 10.15 19.6 
FED35 T3-05 A 35 10 63 10.19 24.8 
FED35 T3-06 A 35 10 63 10.23 30 
FED35 T3-07 A 35 10 63 10.31 40.4 
FED35 T3-08 A 35 10 63 10.38 49.5 
FED35 T3-09 A 35 10 63 10.58 75.6 
FED35 T3-10 A 35 10 63 10.77 100.4 
FED35 T3-11 A 35 10 63 10.96 125.1 
FED35 T3-12 A 35 10 63 11.15 149.9 
FED35 T3-13 A 35 10 63 11.34 174.7 
FED35 T3-14 A 35 10 63 11.53 199.4 
FED35 T3-15 A 35 10 63 12.3 299.8 
FED35 T3-16 A 35 10 63 13.07 400.2 
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FED35 T3-17 A 35 10 63 13.84 500.6 
FED35 T3-18 A 35 30 63 30.12 5.2 
FED35 T3-19 A 35 30 63 30.23 10 
FED35 T3-20 A 35 30 63 30.35 15.2 
FED35 T3-21 A 35 30 63 30.46 20 
FED35 T3-22 A 35 30 63 30.58 25.2 
FED35 T3-23 A 35 30 63 30.69 30 
FED35 T3-24 A 35 30 63 30.92 40 
FED35 T3-25 A 35 30 63 31.15 50 
FED35 T3-26 A 35 30 63 31.73 75.2 
FED35 T3-27 A 35 30 63 32.3 99.9 
FED35 T3-28 A 35 30 63 32.88 125.1 
FED35 T3-29 A 35 30 63 33.45 149.9 
FED35 T3-30 A 35 30 63 34.03 175.1 
FED35 T3-31 A 35 30 63 34.6 199.9 
FED35 T3-32 A 35 30 63 36.9 299.8 
FED35 T3-33 A 35 30 63 39.21 400.2 
FED35 T3-34 A 35 30 63 41.51 500.1 
FED35 T3-35 A 35 60 63 60.23 5 
FED35 T3-36 A 35 60 63 60.46 10 
FED35 T3-37 A 35 60 63 60.69 15 
FED35 T3-38 A 35 60 63 60.92 20 
FED35 T3-39 A 35 60 63 61.15 25 
FED35 T3-40 A 35 60 63 61.38 30 
FED35 T3-41 A 35 60 63 61.84 40 
FED35 T3-42 A 35 60 63 62.3 50 
FED35 T3-43 A 35 60 63 63.45 75 
FED35 T3-44 A 35 60 63 64.6 99.9 
FED35 T3-45 A 35 60 63 65.75 124.9 
FED35 T3-46 A 35 60 63 66.9 149.9 
FED35 T3-47 A 35 60 63 68.05 174.9 
FED35 T3-48 A 35 60 63 69.21 200.1 
FED35 T3-49 A 35 60 63 73.81 300 
FED35 T3-50 A 35 60 63 78.41 400 
FED35 T3-51 A 35 60 63 83.01 499.9 
FED35 T3-52 A 35 100 63 100.38 5 
FED35 T3-53 A 35 100 63 100.77 10 
FED35 T3-54 A 35 100 63 101.15 15 
FED35 T3-55 A 35 100 63 101.53 19.9 
FED35 T3-56 A 35 100 63 101.92 25 
FED35 T3-57 A 35 100 63 102.3 30 
FED35 T3-58 A 35 100 63 103.07 40 
FED35 T3-59 A 35 100 63 103.84 50.1 
FED35 T3-60 A 35 100 63 105.75 75 
FED35 T3-61 A 35 100 63 107.67 100 
FED35 T3-62 A 35 100 63 109.59 125 
FED35 T3-63 A 35 100 63 111.51 150 
FED35 T3-64 A 35 100 63 113.42 174.9 
FED35 T3-65 A 35 100 63 115.34 200 
FED35 T3-66 A 35 100 63 123.01 300 
FED35 T3-67 A 35 100 63 130.68 399.9 
FED35 T3-68 A 35 100 63 138.36 500.1 
FED35 T3-69 A 35 300 63 301.15 5 
FED35 T3-70 A 35 300 63 302.3 10 
FED35 T3-71 A 35 300 63 303.45 15 
FED35 T3-72 A 35 300 63 304.6 20 
FED35 T3-73 A 35 300 63 305.75 25 
FED35 T3-74 A 35 300 63 306.9 30 
FED35 T3-75 A 35 300 63 309.21 40 
FED35 T3-76 A 35 300 63 311.51 50 
FED35 T3-77 A 35 300 63 317.26 75 
FED35 T3-78 A 35 300 63 323.01 100 
FED35 T3-79 A 35 300 63 328.77 125 
FED35 T3-80 A 35 300 63 334.52 150 
FED35 T3-81 A 35 300 63 340.27 175 
FED35 T3-82 A 35 300 63 346.03 200 
FED35 T3-83 A 35 300 63 369.04 300 
FED35 T3-84 A 35 300 63 392.05 400 
FED35 T3-85 A 35 300 63 415.07 500 
Free2 T4-01 A 0 10 28 10.04 5.2 
Free2 T4-01 B 35 10 63 10.04 5.2 
Free2 T4-02 A 0 10 28 10.08 10.4 
Free2 T4-02 B 35 10 63 10.08 10.4 
Free2 T4-03 A 0 10 28 10.12 15.6 
Free2 T4-03 B 35 10 63 10.12 15.6 
Free2 T4-04 A 0 10 28 10.15 19.6 
Free2 T4-04 B 35 10 63 10.15 19.6 
 A46
treatment qid period FED (days) Sooner ($) Horizon (days) Later ($) Nominal rate (%) 
Free2 T4-05 A 0 10 28 10.19 24.8 
Free2 T4-05 B 35 10 63 10.19 24.8 
Free2 T4-06 A 0 10 28 10.23 30 
Free2 T4-06 B 35 10 63 10.23 30 
Free2 T4-07 A 0 10 28 10.31 40.4 
Free2 T4-07 B 35 10 63 10.31 40.4 
Free2 T4-08 A 0 10 28 10.38 49.5 
Free2 T4-08 B 35 10 63 10.38 49.5 
Free2 T4-09 A 0 10 28 10.58 75.6 
Free2 T4-09 B 35 10 63 10.58 75.6 
Free2 T4-10 A 0 10 28 10.77 100.4 
Free2 T4-10 B 35 10 63 10.77 100.4 
Free2 T4-11 A 0 10 28 10.96 125.1 
Free2 T4-11 B 35 10 63 10.96 125.1 
Free2 T4-12 A 0 10 28 11.15 149.9 
Free2 T4-12 B 35 10 63 11.15 149.9 
Free2 T4-13 A 0 10 28 11.34 174.7 
Free2 T4-13 B 35 10 63 11.34 174.7 
Free2 T4-14 A 0 10 28 11.53 199.4 
Free2 T4-14 B 35 10 63 11.53 199.4 
Free2 T4-15 A 0 10 28 12.3 299.8 
Free2 T4-15 B 35 10 63 12.3 299.8 
Free2 T4-16 A 0 10 28 13.07 400.2 
Free2 T4-16 B 35 10 63 13.07 400.2 
Free2 T4-17 A 0 10 28 13.84 500.6 
Free2 T4-17 B 35 10 63 13.84 500.6 
Free2 T4-18 A 0 30 28 30.12 5.2 
Free2 T4-18 B 35 30 63 30.12 5.2 
Free2 T4-19 A 0 30 28 30.23 10 
Free2 T4-19 B 35 30 63 30.23 10 
Free2 T4-20 A 0 30 28 30.35 15.2 
Free2 T4-20 B 35 30 63 30.35 15.2 
Free2 T4-21 A 0 30 28 30.46 20 
Free2 T4-21 B 35 30 63 30.46 20 
Free2 T4-22 A 0 30 28 30.58 25.2 
Free2 T4-22 B 35 30 63 30.58 25.2 
Free2 T4-23 A 0 30 28 30.69 30 
Free2 T4-23 B 35 30 63 30.69 30 
Free2 T4-24 A 0 30 28 30.92 40 
Free2 T4-24 B 35 30 63 30.92 40 
Free2 T4-25 A 0 30 28 31.15 50 
Free2 T4-25 B 35 30 63 31.15 50 
Free2 T4-26 A 0 30 28 31.73 75.2 
Free2 T4-26 B 35 30 63 31.73 75.2 
Free2 T4-27 A 0 30 28 32.3 99.9 
Free2 T4-27 B 35 30 63 32.3 99.9 
Free2 T4-28 A 0 30 28 32.88 125.1 
Free2 T4-28 B 35 30 63 32.88 125.1 
Free2 T4-29 A 0 30 28 33.45 149.9 
Free2 T4-29 B 35 30 63 33.45 149.9 
Free2 T4-30 A 0 30 28 34.03 175.1 
Free2 T4-30 B 35 30 63 34.03 175.1 
Free2 T4-31 A 0 30 28 34.6 199.9 
Free2 T4-31 B 35 30 63 34.6 199.9 
Free2 T4-32 A 0 30 28 36.9 299.8 
Free2 T4-32 B 35 30 63 36.9 299.8 
Free2 T4-33 A 0 30 28 39.21 400.2 
Free2 T4-33 B 35 30 63 39.21 400.2 
Free2 T4-34 A 0 30 28 41.51 500.1 
Free2 T4-34 B 35 30 63 41.51 500.1 
Free2 T4-35 A 0 60 28 60.23 5 
Free2 T4-35 B 35 60 63 60.23 5 
Free2 T4-36 A 0 60 28 60.46 10 
Free2 T4-36 B 35 60 63 60.46 10 
Free2 T4-37 A 0 60 28 60.69 15 
Free2 T4-37 B 35 60 63 60.69 15 
Free2 T4-38 A 0 60 28 60.92 20 
Free2 T4-38 B 35 60 63 60.92 20 
Free2 T4-39 A 0 60 28 61.15 25 
Free2 T4-39 B 35 60 63 61.15 25 
Free2 T4-40 A 0 60 28 61.38 30 
Free2 T4-40 B 35 60 63 61.38 30 
Free2 T4-41 A 0 60 28 61.84 40 
Free2 T4-41 B 35 60 63 61.84 40 
Free2 T4-42 A 0 60 28 62.3 50 
Free2 T4-42 B 35 60 63 62.3 50 
Free2 T4-43 A 0 60 28 63.45 75 
 A47
treatment qid period FED (days) Sooner ($) Horizon (days) Later ($) Nominal rate (%) 
Free2 T4-43 B 35 60 63 63.45 75 
Free2 T4-44 A 0 60 28 64.6 99.9 
Free2 T4-44 B 35 60 63 64.6 99.9 
Free2 T4-45 A 0 60 28 65.75 124.9 
Free2 T4-45 B 35 60 63 65.75 124.9 
Free2 T4-46 A 0 60 28 66.9 149.9 
Free2 T4-46 B 35 60 63 66.9 149.9 
Free2 T4-47 A 0 60 28 68.05 174.9 
Free2 T4-47 B 35 60 63 68.05 174.9 
Free2 T4-48 A 0 60 28 69.21 200.1 
Free2 T4-48 B 35 60 63 69.21 200.1 
Free2 T4-49 A 0 60 28 73.81 300 
Free2 T4-49 B 35 60 63 73.81 300 
Free2 T4-50 A 0 60 28 78.41 400 
Free2 T4-50 B 35 60 63 78.41 400 
Free2 T4-51 A 0 60 28 83.01 499.9 
Free2 T4-51 B 35 60 63 83.01 499.9 
Free2 T4-52 A 0 100 28 100.38 5 
Free2 T4-52 B 35 100 63 100.38 5 
Free2 T4-53 A 0 100 28 100.77 10 
Free2 T4-53 B 35 100 63 100.77 10 
Free2 T4-54 A 0 100 28 101.15 15 
Free2 T4-54 B 35 100 63 101.15 15 
Free2 T4-55 A 0 100 28 101.53 19.9 
Free2 T4-55 B 35 100 63 101.53 19.9 
Free2 T4-56 A 0 100 28 101.92 25 
Free2 T4-56 B 35 100 63 101.92 25 
Free2 T4-57 A 0 100 28 102.3 30 
Free2 T4-57 B 35 100 63 102.3 30 
Free2 T4-58 A 0 100 28 103.07 40 
Free2 T4-58 B 35 100 63 103.07 40 
Free2 T4-59 A 0 100 28 103.84 50.1 
Free2 T4-59 B 35 100 63 103.84 50.1 
Free2 T4-60 A 0 100 28 105.75 75 
Free2 T4-60 B 35 100 63 105.75 75 
Free2 T4-61 A 0 100 28 107.67 100 
Free2 T4-61 B 35 100 63 107.67 100 
Free2 T4-62 A 0 100 28 109.59 125 
Free2 T4-62 B 35 100 63 109.59 125 
Free2 T4-63 A 0 100 28 111.51 150 
Free2 T4-63 B 35 100 63 111.51 150 
Free2 T4-64 A 0 100 28 113.42 174.9 
Free2 T4-64 B 35 100 63 113.42 174.9 
Free2 T4-65 A 0 100 28 115.34 200 
Free2 T4-65 B 35 100 63 115.34 200 
Free2 T4-66 A 0 100 28 123.01 300 
Free2 T4-66 B 35 100 63 123.01 300 
Free2 T4-67 A 0 100 28 130.68 399.9 
Free2 T4-67 B 35 100 63 130.68 399.9 
Free2 T4-68 A 0 100 28 138.36 500.1 
Free2 T4-68 B 35 100 63 138.36 500.1 
Free2 T4-69 A 0 300 28 301.15 5 
Free2 T4-69 B 35 300 63 301.15 5 
Free2 T4-70 A 0 300 28 302.3 10 
Free2 T4-70 B 35 300 63 302.3 10 
Free2 T4-71 A 0 300 28 303.45 15 
Free2 T4-71 B 35 300 63 303.45 15 
Free2 T4-72 A 0 300 28 304.6 20 
Free2 T4-72 B 35 300 63 304.6 20 
Free2 T4-73 A 0 300 28 305.75 25 
Free2 T4-73 B 35 300 63 305.75 25 
Free2 T4-74 A 0 300 28 306.9 30 
Free2 T4-74 B 35 300 63 306.9 30 
Free2 T4-75 A 0 300 28 309.21 40 
Free2 T4-75 B 35 300 63 309.21 40 
Free2 T4-76 A 0 300 28 311.51 50 
Free2 T4-76 B 35 300 63 311.51 50 
Free2 T4-77 A 0 300 28 317.26 75 
Free2 T4-77 B 35 300 63 317.26 75 
Free2 T4-78 A 0 300 28 323.01 100 
Free2 T4-78 B 35 300 63 323.01 100 
Free2 T4-79 A 0 300 28 328.77 125 
Free2 T4-79 B 35 300 63 328.77 125 
Free2 T4-80 A 0 300 28 334.52 150 
Free2 T4-80 B 35 300 63 334.52 150 
Free2 T4-81 A 0 300 28 340.27 175 
Free2 T4-81 B 35 300 63 340.27 175 
 A48
treatment qid period FED (days) Sooner ($) Horizon (days) Later ($) Nominal rate (%) 
Free2 T4-82 A 0 300 28 346.03 200 
Free2 T4-82 B 35 300 63 346.03 200 
Free2 T4-83 A 0 300 28 369.04 300 
Free2 T4-83 B 35 300 63 369.04 300 
Free2 T4-84 A 0 300 28 392.05 400 
Free2 T4-84 B 35 300 63 392.05 400 
Free2 T4-85 A 0 300 28 415.07 500 
Free2 T4-85 B 35 300 63 415.07 500 
Free3 T6-01 A 0 10 28 10.04 5.2 
Free3 T6-01 B 35 10 63 10.04 5.2 
Free3 T6-01 C 70 10 98 10.04 5.2 
Free3 T6-02 A 0 10 28 10.08 10.4 
Free3 T6-02 B 35 10 63 10.08 10.4 
Free3 T6-02 C 70 10 98 10.08 10.4 
Free3 T6-03 A 0 10 28 10.12 15.6 
Free3 T6-03 B 35 10 63 10.12 15.6 
Free3 T6-03 C 70 10 98 10.12 15.6 
Free3 T6-04 A 0 10 28 10.15 19.6 
Free3 T6-04 B 35 10 63 10.15 19.6 
Free3 T6-04 C 70 10 98 10.15 19.6 
Free3 T6-05 A 0 10 28 10.19 24.8 
Free3 T6-05 B 35 10 63 10.19 24.8 
Free3 T6-05 C 70 10 98 10.19 24.8 
Free3 T6-06 A 0 10 28 10.23 30 
Free3 T6-06 B 35 10 63 10.23 30 
Free3 T6-06 C 70 10 98 10.23 30 
Free3 T6-07 A 0 10 28 10.31 40.4 
Free3 T6-07 B 35 10 63 10.31 40.4 
Free3 T6-07 C 70 10 98 10.31 40.4 
Free3 T6-08 A 0 10 28 10.38 49.5 
Free3 T6-08 B 35 10 63 10.38 49.5 
Free3 T6-08 C 70 10 98 10.38 49.5 
Free3 T6-09 A 0 10 28 10.58 75.6 
Free3 T6-09 B 35 10 63 10.58 75.6 
Free3 T6-09 C 70 10 98 10.58 75.6 
Free3 T6-10 A 0 10 28 10.77 100.4 
Free3 T6-10 B 35 10 63 10.77 100.4 
Free3 T6-10 C 70 10 98 10.77 100.4 
Free3 T6-11 A 0 10 28 10.96 125.1 
Free3 T6-11 B 35 10 63 10.96 125.1 
Free3 T6-11 C 70 10 98 10.96 125.1 
Free3 T6-12 A 0 10 28 11.15 149.9 
Free3 T6-12 B 35 10 63 11.15 149.9 
Free3 T6-12 C 70 10 98 11.15 149.9 
Free3 T6-13 A 0 10 28 11.34 174.7 
Free3 T6-13 B 35 10 63 11.34 174.7 
Free3 T6-13 C 70 10 98 11.34 174.7 
Free3 T6-14 A 0 10 28 11.53 199.4 
Free3 T6-14 B 35 10 63 11.53 199.4 
Free3 T6-14 C 70 10 98 11.53 199.4 
Free3 T6-15 A 0 10 28 12.3 299.8 
Free3 T6-15 B 35 10 63 12.3 299.8 
Free3 T6-15 C 70 10 98 12.3 299.8 
Free3 T6-16 A 0 10 28 13.07 400.2 
Free3 T6-16 B 35 10 63 13.07 400.2 
Free3 T6-16 C 70 10 98 13.07 400.2 
Free3 T6-17 A 0 10 28 13.84 500.6 
Free3 T6-17 B 35 10 63 13.84 500.6 
Free3 T6-17 C 70 10 98 13.84 500.6 
Free3 T6-18 A 0 30 28 30.12 5.2 
Free3 T6-18 B 35 30 63 30.12 5.2 
Free3 T6-18 C 70 30 98 30.12 5.2 
Free3 T6-19 A 0 30 28 30.23 10 
Free3 T6-19 B 35 30 63 30.23 10 
Free3 T6-19 C 70 30 98 30.23 10 
Free3 T6-20 A 0 30 28 30.35 15.2 
Free3 T6-20 B 35 30 63 30.35 15.2 
Free3 T6-20 C 70 30 98 30.35 15.2 
Free3 T6-21 A 0 30 28 30.46 20 
Free3 T6-21 B 35 30 63 30.46 20 
Free3 T6-21 C 70 30 98 30.46 20 
Free3 T6-22 A 0 30 28 30.58 25.2 
Free3 T6-22 B 35 30 63 30.58 25.2 
Free3 T6-22 C 70 30 98 30.58 25.2 
Free3 T6-23 A 0 30 28 30.69 30 
Free3 T6-23 B 35 30 63 30.69 30 
Free3 T6-23 C 70 30 98 30.69 30 
 A49
treatment qid period FED (days) Sooner ($) Horizon (days) Later ($) Nominal rate (%) 
Free3 T6-24 A 0 30 28 30.92 40 
Free3 T6-24 B 35 30 63 30.92 40 
Free3 T6-24 C 70 30 98 30.92 40 
Free3 T6-25 A 0 30 28 31.15 50 
Free3 T6-25 B 35 30 63 31.15 50 
Free3 T6-25 C 70 30 98 31.15 50 
Free3 T6-26 A 0 30 28 31.73 75.2 
Free3 T6-26 B 35 30 63 31.73 75.2 
Free3 T6-26 C 70 30 98 31.73 75.2 
Free3 T6-27 A 0 30 28 32.3 99.9 
Free3 T6-27 B 35 30 63 32.3 99.9 
Free3 T6-27 C 70 30 98 32.3 99.9 
Free3 T6-28 A 0 30 28 32.88 125.1 
Free3 T6-28 B 35 30 63 32.88 125.1 
Free3 T6-28 C 70 30 98 32.88 125.1 
Free3 T6-29 A 0 30 28 33.45 149.9 
Free3 T6-29 B 35 30 63 33.45 149.9 
Free3 T6-29 C 70 30 98 33.45 149.9 
Free3 T6-30 A 0 30 28 34.03 175.1 
Free3 T6-30 B 35 30 63 34.03 175.1 
Free3 T6-30 C 70 30 98 34.03 175.1 
Free3 T6-31 A 0 30 28 34.6 199.9 
Free3 T6-31 B 35 30 63 34.6 199.9 
Free3 T6-31 C 70 30 98 34.6 199.9 
Free3 T6-32 A 0 30 28 36.9 299.8 
Free3 T6-32 B 35 30 63 36.9 299.8 
Free3 T6-32 C 70 30 98 36.9 299.8 
Free3 T6-33 A 0 30 28 39.21 400.2 
Free3 T6-33 B 35 30 63 39.21 400.2 
Free3 T6-33 C 70 30 98 39.21 400.2 
Free3 T6-34 A 0 30 28 41.51 500.1 
Free3 T6-34 B 35 30 63 41.51 500.1 
Free3 T6-34 C 70 30 98 41.51 500.1 
Free3 T6-35 A 0 60 28 60.23 5 
Free3 T6-35 B 35 60 63 60.23 5 
Free3 T6-35 C 70 60 98 60.23 5 
Free3 T6-36 A 0 60 28 60.46 10 
Free3 T6-36 B 35 60 63 60.46 10 
Free3 T6-36 C 70 60 98 60.46 10 
Free3 T6-37 A 0 60 28 60.69 15 
Free3 T6-37 B 35 60 63 60.69 15 
Free3 T6-37 C 70 60 98 60.69 15 
Free3 T6-38 A 0 60 28 60.92 20 
Free3 T6-38 B 35 60 63 60.92 20 
Free3 T6-38 C 70 60 98 60.92 20 
Free3 T6-39 A 0 60 28 61.15 25 
Free3 T6-39 B 35 60 63 61.15 25 
Free3 T6-39 C 70 60 98 61.15 25 
Free3 T6-40 A 0 60 28 61.38 30 
Free3 T6-40 B 35 60 63 61.38 30 
Free3 T6-40 C 70 60 98 61.38 30 
Free3 T6-41 A 0 60 28 61.84 40 
Free3 T6-41 B 35 60 63 61.84 40 
Free3 T6-41 C 70 60 98 61.84 40 
Free3 T6-42 A 0 60 28 62.3 50 
Free3 T6-42 B 35 60 63 62.3 50 
Free3 T6-42 C 70 60 98 62.3 50 
Free3 T6-43 A 0 60 28 63.45 75 
Free3 T6-43 B 35 60 63 63.45 75 
Free3 T6-43 C 70 60 98 63.45 75 
Free3 T6-44 A 0 60 28 64.6 99.9 
Free3 T6-44 B 35 60 63 64.6 99.9 
Free3 T6-44 C 70 60 98 64.6 99.9 
Free3 T6-45 A 0 60 28 65.75 124.9 
Free3 T6-45 B 35 60 63 65.75 124.9 
Free3 T6-45 C 70 60 98 65.75 124.9 
Free3 T6-46 A 0 60 28 66.9 149.9 
Free3 T6-46 B 35 60 63 66.9 149.9 
Free3 T6-46 C 70 60 98 66.9 149.9 
Free3 T6-47 A 0 60 28 68.05 174.9 
Free3 T6-47 B 35 60 63 68.05 174.9 
Free3 T6-47 C 70 60 98 68.05 174.9 
Free3 T6-48 A 0 60 28 69.21 200.1 
Free3 T6-48 B 35 60 63 69.21 200.1 
Free3 T6-48 C 70 60 98 69.21 200.1 
Free3 T6-49 A 0 60 28 73.81 300 
Free3 T6-49 B 35 60 63 73.81 300 
 A50
treatment qid period FED (days) Sooner ($) Horizon (days) Later ($) Nominal rate (%) 
Free3 T6-49 C 70 60 98 73.81 300 
Free3 T6-50 A 0 60 28 78.41 400 
Free3 T6-50 B 35 60 63 78.41 400 
Free3 T6-50 C 70 60 98 78.41 400 
Free3 T6-51 A 0 60 28 83.01 499.9 
Free3 T6-51 B 35 60 63 83.01 499.9 
Free3 T6-51 C 70 60 98 83.01 499.9 
Free3 T6-52 A 0 100 28 100.38 5 
Free3 T6-52 B 35 100 63 100.38 5 
Free3 T6-52 C 70 100 98 100.38 5 
Free3 T6-53 A 0 100 28 100.77 10 
Free3 T6-53 B 35 100 63 100.77 10 
Free3 T6-53 C 70 100 98 100.77 10 
Free3 T6-54 A 0 100 28 101.15 15 
Free3 T6-54 B 35 100 63 101.15 15 
Free3 T6-54 C 70 100 98 101.15 15 
Free3 T6-55 A 0 100 28 101.53 19.9 
Free3 T6-55 B 35 100 63 101.53 19.9 
Free3 T6-55 C 70 100 98 101.53 19.9 
Free3 T6-56 A 0 100 28 101.92 25 
Free3 T6-56 B 35 100 63 101.92 25 
Free3 T6-56 C 70 100 98 101.92 25 
Free3 T6-57 A 0 100 28 102.3 30 
Free3 T6-57 B 35 100 63 102.3 30 
Free3 T6-57 C 70 100 98 102.3 30 
Free3 T6-58 A 0 100 28 103.07 40 
Free3 T6-58 B 35 100 63 103.07 40 
Free3 T6-58 C 70 100 98 103.07 40 
Free3 T6-59 A 0 100 28 103.84 50.1 
Free3 T6-59 B 35 100 63 103.84 50.1 
Free3 T6-59 C 70 100 98 103.84 50.1 
Free3 T6-60 A 0 100 28 105.75 75 
Free3 T6-60 B 35 100 63 105.75 75 
Free3 T6-60 C 70 100 98 105.75 75 
Free3 T6-61 A 0 100 28 107.67 100 
Free3 T6-61 B 35 100 63 107.67 100 
Free3 T6-61 C 70 100 98 107.67 100 
Free3 T6-62 A 0 100 28 109.59 125 
Free3 T6-62 B 35 100 63 109.59 125 
Free3 T6-62 C 70 100 98 109.59 125 
Free3 T6-63 A 0 100 28 111.51 150 
Free3 T6-63 B 35 100 63 111.51 150 
Free3 T6-63 C 70 100 98 111.51 150 
Free3 T6-64 A 0 100 28 113.42 174.9 
Free3 T6-64 B 35 100 63 113.42 174.9 
Free3 T6-64 C 70 100 98 113.42 174.9 
Free3 T6-65 A 0 100 28 115.34 200 
Free3 T6-65 B 35 100 63 115.34 200 
Free3 T6-65 C 70 100 98 115.34 200 
Free3 T6-66 A 0 100 28 123.01 300 
Free3 T6-66 B 35 100 63 123.01 300 
Free3 T6-66 C 70 100 98 123.01 300 
Free3 T6-67 A 0 100 28 130.68 399.9 
Free3 T6-67 B 35 100 63 130.68 399.9 
Free3 T6-67 C 70 100 98 130.68 399.9 
Free3 T6-68 A 0 100 28 138.36 500.1 
Free3 T6-68 B 35 100 63 138.36 500.1 
Free3 T6-68 C 70 100 98 138.36 500.1 
Free3 T6-69 A 0 300 28 301.15 5 
Free3 T6-69 B 35 300 63 301.15 5 
Free3 T6-69 C 70 300 98 301.15 5 
Free3 T6-70 A 0 300 28 302.3 10 
Free3 T6-70 B 35 300 63 302.3 10 
Free3 T6-70 C 70 300 98 302.3 10 
Free3 T6-71 A 0 300 28 303.45 15 
Free3 T6-71 B 35 300 63 303.45 15 
Free3 T6-71 C 70 300 98 303.45 15 
Free3 T6-72 A 0 300 28 304.6 20 
Free3 T6-72 B 35 300 63 304.6 20 
Free3 T6-72 C 70 300 98 304.6 20 
Free3 T6-73 A 0 300 28 305.75 25 
Free3 T6-73 B 35 300 63 305.75 25 
Free3 T6-73 C 70 300 98 305.75 25 
Free3 T6-74 A 0 300 28 306.9 30 
Free3 T6-74 B 35 300 63 306.9 30 
Free3 T6-74 C 70 300 98 306.9 30 
Free3 T6-75 A 0 300 28 309.21 40 
 A51
treatment qid period FED (days) Sooner ($) Horizon (days) Later ($) Nominal rate (%) 
Free3 T6-75 B 35 300 63 309.21 40 
Free3 T6-75 C 70 300 98 309.21 40 
Free3 T6-76 A 0 300 28 311.51 50 
Free3 T6-76 B 35 300 63 311.51 50 
Free3 T6-76 C 70 300 98 311.51 50 
Free3 T6-77 A 0 300 28 317.26 75 
Free3 T6-77 B 35 300 63 317.26 75 
Free3 T6-77 C 70 300 98 317.26 75 
Free3 T6-78 A 0 300 28 323.01 100 
Free3 T6-78 B 35 300 63 323.01 100 
Free3 T6-78 C 70 300 98 323.01 100 
Free3 T6-79 A 0 300 28 328.77 125 
Free3 T6-79 B 35 300 63 328.77 125 
Free3 T6-79 C 70 300 98 328.77 125 
Free3 T6-80 A 0 300 28 334.52 150 
Free3 T6-80 B 35 300 63 334.52 150 
Free3 T6-80 C 70 300 98 334.52 150 
Free3 T6-81 A 0 300 28 340.27 175 
Free3 T6-81 B 35 300 63 340.27 175 
Free3 T6-81 C 70 300 98 340.27 175 
Free3 T6-82 A 0 300 28 346.03 200 
Free3 T6-82 B 35 300 63 346.03 200 
Free3 T6-82 C 70 300 98 346.03 200 
Free3 T6-83 A 0 300 28 369.04 300 
Free3 T6-83 B 35 300 63 369.04 300 
Free3 T6-83 C 70 300 98 369.04 300 
Free3 T6-84 A 0 300 28 392.05 400 
Free3 T6-84 B 35 300 63 392.05 400 
Free3 T6-84 C 70 300 98 392.05 400 
Free3 T6-85 A 0 300 28 415.07 500 
Free3 T6-85 B 35 300 63 415.07 500 




Appendix E: Additional Estimation Results 
 
A. Risk Preferences 
 
 The estimates below are for four models: EUT, RDU with Power Probability Weighting Function 
(pwf), RDU with Inverse-S pwf, and RDU with Prelec pwf. These are pooled over N = 171 subjects drawn 
from the same population as the bundling experiments. Since EUT is nested within RDU, we can directly 
examine the aggregate log-likelihood values to see that the RDU specifications all dominate the EUT 
specification, and that the RDU model with Prelec pwf is the best. 
 Figure E1 displays the three RDU pwf estimates, as well as the EUT special case for reference. 
Formal hypothesis tests of the restriction to EUT are listed below after each set of RDU estimates. Figure 
E2 then focusses on the preferred Prelec pwf, and shows implications for decision weights. The right panel 
in Figure E2 displays the effect of probability weighting for 2-prize, 3-prize and 4-prize lotteries with equi-
probable outcomes, to see the “pure” effect of rank-dependent probability weighting. The effect is to give 
greater weight to extreme prizes when there are 3 or 4 prizes in the lottery, and greater weight to the worst 
prize when there are only 2 prizes. 
 
 
Expected Utility Theory 
 
Log pseudolikelihood = -8340.4709        
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   .8262663   .0101722    81.23   0.000     .8063292    .8462033 





RDU with Power Probability Weighting Function 
 
Log pseudolikelihood = -8329.1901           
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   .8138222    .010888    74.75   0.000     .7924822    .8351622 
       gamma |   1.142514    .074594    15.32   0.000     .9963124    1.288716 
          mu |    .146845   .0068445    21.45   0.000     .1334301      .16026 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.         * test EUT 
.         test gamma==1 
 
           chi2(  1) =    3.65 






RDU with Inverse-S Probability Weighting Function 
 
Log pseudolikelihood = -8167.2717            
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   .6825555   .0140615    48.54   0.000     .6549954    .7101156 
       gamma |   .7191498   .0186792    38.50   0.000     .6825393    .7557603 
          mu |   .1414775   .0065038    21.75   0.000     .1287304    .1542247 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.         * test EUT 
.         test gamma==1 
 
           chi2(  1) =  226.07 




RDU with Prelec Probability Weighting Function 
 
Log pseudolikelihood = -8142.5023           
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |    .661865    .014231    46.51   0.000     .6339727    .6897572 
         eta |   .9126632   .0298124    30.61   0.000     .8542318    .9710945 
         phi |   .6234765   .0261367    23.85   0.000     .5722494    .6747035 




.         * test EUT 
.         test eta=phi=1 
 
           chi2(  2) =  210.47 









B. Effects of Scaling Payoffs on Discounting 
 
A theoretical consideration addressed by the design is the hypothesized magnitude effect. As noted in 
the text, this effect refers to a behavioral regularity commonly reported in the psychological literature that 
humans tend to exhibit lower implied discount rates when payoffs are larger. Our basic design included a 
within-subjects control for this effect, by varying the principal in each and every session and for each 
subject. 
In addition, we added one session to conduct a direct, between-subject test of the magnitude effect. 
This test is clean in the sense that it is the only change in the discounting task, but it is between-subjects, so 
not as powerful as the controls included in the main design. This extra session is referred to as treatment 
HiMag: it follows from the FED0 treatment and simply triples the FED0 SS amounts. Consequently, the SS 
amounts in the HiMag treatment range from $30 to $900. The HiMag LL rewards are calculated with the 
same interest rates as in the FED0 treatment. As with treatment FED0, the payout date for SS rewards was 
the day on which the session took place, while the payout date for LL rewards was 28 days after the session.4 
 We can consider the effect of this HiMag treatment by pooling the data from the HiMag and FED0 
sessions and simply testing for a difference in the parameters of discounting models. The first set of 
estimates are for the Exponential discounting model, in which a dummy variable scale is added to the 
parameter for the discount rate, δ. The first set of estimates are for δ when scale = 0, and then the marginal 
and total effect of having scale=1 are estimated. The second set of estimates are for the Hyperbolic 
discounting model. 
Assuming Exponential discounting, in this instance solely for descriptive purposes,5 the discount 
rate with the lower scale is 368% with a standard error of 108%. The marginal effect of tripling the 
principals is -96% and is not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.12. The marginal effect is within one 
standard error of the baseline discount rate in FED0. Hence we reject the hypothesis that discounting 
                                                 
4 In treatment HiMag, where the amounts were tripled, a selected amount was considered small and paid with 
certainty if it was less than $300. The payment of $300 or more was determined by the same stochastic mechanism 
described in the text for other treatments. 
5 This use of exponential discounting is common in the literature on the magnitude effect, surveyed in detail by 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2013].  
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behavior is significantly affected by scale. In this instance the rigorous inferences from the structural 
analysis, controlling for U″ and noise around the predictions of a specific discounting model, differ from the 
apparent inferences from the descriptive analysis. 
 Since there is no FED, it is not possible to identify a Quasi-Hyperbolic model. The same qualitative 
result is obtained if one uses a Hyperbolic discounting model instead of the Exponential discounting model: 
as shown below, the marginal effect on the parameter K is negative and statistically insignificant with a p-





             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   .6618651   .0142187    46.55   0.000     .6339969    .6897332 
         eta |   .9126632   .0297868    30.64   0.000     .8542822    .9710441 
         phi |   .6234766   .0261142    23.88   0.000     .5722937    .6746594 
       delta |    3.68338   1.083254     3.40   0.001     1.560241     5.80652 
        muRA |   .1397306   .0064571    21.64   0.000     .1270749    .1523863 
       muIDR |    .041877   .0042702     9.81   0.000     .0335076    .0502465 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.         * marginal effect 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 delta_scale |  -.9581774   .6161602    -1.56   0.120    -2.165829    .2494744 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.         * total effect 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 







             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   .6618649   .0142187    46.55   0.000     .6339967    .6897331 
         eta |   .9126631   .0297868    30.64   0.000     .8542822    .9710441 
         phi |   .6234764   .0261142    23.88   0.000     .5722936    .6746593 
           K |   1.761581   .3198263     5.51   0.000     1.134733    2.388429 
        muRA |   .1397306   .0064571    21.64   0.000     .1270749    .1523863 






.         * marginal effect 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     K_scale |  -.2720977   .1732199    -1.57   0.116    -.6116025    .0674071 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
          * total effect 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 





C. Models of Discounting 
 
 These estimates are for individual discounting functions applied across the experimental treatments 
defined in the text. It is useful to show the raw estimates and then the transformed estimates, to make it 
clear how various constraints (e.g., non-negativity) have been implemented. For the Quasi-Hyperbolic and 
Weibull specifications the transformed coefficient estimates also include tests of the Exponential 




                                                Number of obs     =    397,470 
                                                Wald chi2(0)      =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -247977.33               Prob > chi2       =          . 
 
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 270 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
r_           | 
       _cons |  -.6716164   .0635196   -10.57   0.000    -.7961125   -.5471204 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNeta        | 
       _cons |  -.0913884   .0326302    -2.80   0.005    -.1553424   -.0274345 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNphi        | 
       _cons |  -.4724442   .0418758   -11.28   0.000    -.5545193   -.3903692 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNdelta      | 
       _cons |   .6278592   .1399715     4.49   0.000       .35352    .9021984 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNmuRA       | 
       _cons |  -1.968039   .0462012   -42.60   0.000    -2.058592   -1.877486 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNmuIDR      | 




           r:  1/(1+exp([r_]_cons)) 
         eta:  exp([LNeta]_cons) 
         phi:  exp([LNphi]_cons) 
       delta:  exp([LNdelta]_cons) 
        muRA:  exp([LNmuRA]_cons) 
       muIDR:  exp([LNmuIDR]_cons) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |    .661865   .0142157    46.56   0.000     .6340028    .6897272 
         eta |   .9126631   .0297804    30.65   0.000     .8542947    .9710316 
         phi |   .6234765   .0261086    23.88   0.000     .5723046    .6746484 
       delta |   1.873595     .26225     7.14   0.000     1.359595    2.387596 
        muRA |   .1397306   .0064557    21.64   0.000     .1270776    .1523836 






                                                Number of obs     =    397,470 
                                                Wald chi2(0)      =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -247948.8               Prob > chi2       =          . 
 
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 270 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
r_           | 
       _cons |  -.6687687   .0635471   -10.52   0.000    -.7933187   -.5442187 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNeta        | 
       _cons |  -.0913705   .0326141    -2.80   0.005     -.155293    -.027448 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNphi        | 
       _cons |  -.4729573   .0418791   -11.29   0.000    -.5550387   -.3908758 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LN_K         | 
       _cons |   .1441531   .0935946     1.54   0.124     -.039289    .3275951 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNmuRA       | 
       _cons |  -1.967941   .0462063   -42.59   0.000    -2.058504   -1.877378 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNmuIDR      | 
       _cons |   -3.13657   .0919769   -34.10   0.000    -3.316841   -2.956298 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
           r:  1/(1+exp([r_]_cons)) 
         eta:  exp([LNeta]_cons) 
         phi:  exp([LNphi]_cons) 
           K:  exp([LN_K]_cons) 
        muRA:  exp([LNmuRA]_cons) 
       muIDR:  exp([LNmuIDR]_cons) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   .6612274   .0142349    46.45   0.000     .6333275    .6891273 
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         eta |   .9126795   .0297662    30.66   0.000     .8543388    .9710203 
         phi |   .6231567   .0260972    23.88   0.000     .5720071    .6743063 
           K |   1.155061   .1081075    10.68   0.000     .9431742    1.366948 
        muRA |   .1397443   .0064571    21.64   0.000     .1270887    .1523999 






Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting  
 
                                                Number of obs     =    397,470 
                                                Wald chi2(0)      =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -247926.71               Prob > chi2       =          . 
 
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 270 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
r_           | 
       _cons |  -.6716176   .0635196   -10.57   0.000    -.7961138   -.5471215 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNeta        | 
       _cons |  -.0913884   .0326302    -2.80   0.005    -.1553424   -.0274345 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNphi        | 
       _cons |  -.4724439   .0418758   -11.28   0.000     -.554519   -.3903689 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
beta_        | 
       _cons |  -2.047029   .1082875   -18.90   0.000    -2.259269    -1.83479 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNdelta      | 
       _cons |   .2519485   .2208169     1.14   0.254    -.1808447    .6847418 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNmuRA       | 
       _cons |  -1.968039   .0462012   -42.60   0.000    -2.058592   -1.877486 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNmuIDR      | 
       _cons |  -3.149456   .0945099   -33.32   0.000    -3.334692    -2.96422 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
           r:  1/(1+exp([r_]_cons)) 
         eta:  exp([LNeta]_cons ) 
         phi:  exp([LNphi]_cons) 
        beta:  1.1/(1+exp([beta_]_cons)) 
    beta_exp:  1.1/(1+exp([beta_]_cons)) - 1 
       delta:  exp([LNdelta]_cons) 
        muRA:  exp([LNmuRA]_cons) 
       muIDR:  exp([LNmuIDR]_cons) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   .6618653   .0142157    46.56   0.000     .6340031    .6897275 
         eta |   .9126631   .0297804    30.65   0.000     .8542947    .9710316 
         phi |   .6234767   .0261086    23.88   0.000     .5723048    .6746485 
        beta |   .9742118   .0120637    80.76   0.000     .9505675    .9978561 
    beta_exp |  -.0257882   .0120637    -2.14   0.033    -.0494325   -.0021439 
       delta |    1.28653   .2840876     4.53   0.000     .7297284    1.843331 
        muRA |   .1397306   .0064557    21.64   0.000     .1270776    .1523836 






Weibull Discounting  
 
                                                Number of obs     =    397,470 
                                                Wald chi2(0)      =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -247911.25               Prob > chi2       =          . 
 
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 270 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
r_           | 
       _cons |  -.6716157   .0635196   -10.57   0.000    -.7961117   -.5471196 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNeta        | 
       _cons |  -.0913884   .0326302    -2.80   0.005    -.1553424   -.0274345 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNphi        | 
       _cons |  -.4724444   .0418758   -11.28   0.000    -.5545195   -.3903693 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNdelta      | 
       _cons |  -.4340106   .2264769    -1.92   0.055    -.8778971    .0098759 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
s_wei_       | 
       _cons |   .2842131   .1394656     2.04   0.042     .0108655    .5575606 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNmuRA       | 
       _cons |  -1.968039   .0462012   -42.60   0.000    -2.058592   -1.877486 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
LNmuIDR      | 
       _cons |  -3.155662    .094096   -33.54   0.000    -3.340087   -2.971237 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
           r:  1 /(1 +  exp([r_]_cons)) 
         eta:  exp([LNeta]_cons ) 
         phi:  exp([LNphi]_cons) 
       delta:  exp([LNdelta]_cons) 
       s_wei:  exp([s_wei_]_cons) 
   s_wei_exp:  exp([s_wei_]_cons) - 1 
        muRA:  exp([LNmuRA]_cons) 
       muIDR:  exp([LNmuIDR]_cons) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   .6618648   .0142157    46.56   0.000     .6340027     .689727 
         eta |   .9126631   .0297804    30.65   0.000     .8542947    .9710316 
         phi |   .6234764   .0261086    23.88   0.000     .5723045    .6746482 
       delta |   .6479054   .1467356     4.42   0.000     .3603089    .9355019 
       s_wei |   1.328716   .1853102     7.17   0.000     .9655148    1.691917 
   s_wei_exp |    .328716   .1853102     1.77   0.076    -.0344852    .6919173 
        muRA |   .1397306   .0064557    21.64   0.000     .1270776    .1523836 




D. Estimates of Mixture Models 
 
 Table E1 is the same as Table 2, but with additional details provided for covariates. 
 
Table E1: Estimates of Mixture Models 
 










[95% Confidence Interval] 
δ 0.088 0.073 0.232 -0.056 0.231 
K 0.806 0.154 0.000 0.504 1.108 
πE 0.295 0.138 0.033 0.024 0.566 
πH 0.705 0.138 0.000 0.434 0.976 
πE bundled 0.442 0.192 0.021 0.066 0.818 
πE second -0.240 0.096 0.013 -0.429 -0.051 
πE forced 0.466 0.233 0.046 0.009 0.924 
δ bundled 0.052 0.100 0.605 -0.145 0.248 
δ second -0.029 0.028 0.301 -0.085 0.026 
δ  forced 0.324 0.322 0.314 -0.307 0.955 
δ  magnitude10 0.584 0.523 0.265 -0.442 1.610 
δ  magnitude30 0.386 0.364 0.289 -0.327 1.099 
δ  magnitude60 0.133 0.120 0.265 -0.101 0.368 
δ magnitude100 0.142 0.133 0.287 -0.119 0.403 
K bundled 0.494 0.805 0.540 -1.084 2.072 
K second -0.345 0.278 0.215 -0.889 0.200 
K forced 493.442 8830.990 0.955 -1.68e+04 17802.182 
K magnitude10 2.085 0.529 0.000 1.048 3.121 
K magnitude30 1.152 0.190 0.000 0.780 1.524 
K magnitude60 0.526 0.095 0.000 0.341 0.712 
Kmagnitude100 0.751 0.140 0.000 0.476 1.026 
 
 










[95% Confidence Interval] 
δ 0.107 0.083 0.200 -0.056 0.269 
β 0.971 0.011 0.000 0.949 0.993 
δQH 0.682 0.244 0.005 0.204 1.161 
πE 0.292 0.125 0.020 0.046 0.537 
πH 0.708 0.125 0.000 0.463 0.954 
πE bundled 0.429 0.203 0.035 0.031 0.828 
πE second -0.236 0.099 0.017 -0.430 -0.042 
πE forced 0.474 0.197 0.016 0.087 0.860 
δ bundled 0.027 0.109 0.804 -0.187 0.241 
δ second -0.036 0.035 0.311 -0.105 0.034 
δ forced 0.416 0.445 0.349 -0.455 1.288 
δ magnitude10 0.710 0.579 0.221 -0.426 1.845 
δ magnitude30 0.463 0.388 0.232 -0.297 1.224 
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δ magnitude60 0.160 0.130 0.217 -0.094 0.414 
δ magnitude100 0.172 0.144 0.231 -0.110 0.453 
β bundled 0.005 0.040 0.894 -0.073 0.083 
β second 0.033 0.033 0.313 -0.031 0.097 
β forced 0.129 0.011 0.000 0.107 0.151 
β magnitude10 -0.051 0.034 0.134 -0.117 0.016 
β magnitude30 -0.030 0.018 0.096 -0.064 0.005 
β magnitude60 -0.016 0.010 0.101 -0.036 0.003 
β magnitude100 -0.003 0.009 0.720 -0.021 0.015 
δQH bundled 0.963 1.387 0.487 -1.755 3.681 
δQH second -0.256 0.342 0.454 -0.927 0.414 
δQH forced 6.70e+06 9.20e+06 0.466 -1.13e+07 2.47e+07 
δQH magnitude10 3.614 1.946 0.063 -0.199 7.428 
δQH magnitude30 1.600 0.648 0.014 0.330 2.871 
δQH magnitude60 0.604 0.236 0.011 0.141 1.067 
δQHmagnitude100 1.240 0.542 0.022 0.178 2.302 
 
 
